Core System Architecture Part 107 — Anonymous Network Change Impact Analysis, Dependency-Aware Rollout Planning, Pre-Change Simulation, Safe Execution & Privacy-Preserving Operational Decision Architecture
SIAR — Secure, Local-First, Multi-Transport Communication Platform
Series: Core System Architecture
Part: 107
Status: Architecture specification
Primary language: Rust
Builds on: Core System Architecture Parts 52, 61–65, 70–79, 94–106
Primary purpose: define SIAR's change-impact and safe-execution architecture for change intent, dependency-aware impact analysis, blast-radius evaluation, pre-change simulation, rollout planning, canaries, safety gates, abort/rollback, change evidence, tenant/region/federation boundaries, and privacy-preserving operational decision-making.
1. Purpose
A production change is not merely:
apply configuration
deploy artifact
restart service
A safe change process must answer:
What is changing?
What depends on it?
Which regions/tenants/services could be affected?
What assumptions must hold?
How do we test the change before broad rollout?
What evidence allows promotion?
What conditions trigger abort?
Can rollback actually work?
The governing principle is:
SIAR changes should be evaluated against topology, policy, security, privacy, capacity, recovery, and compatibility before execution, and promoted only through explicit evidence-backed safety gates.
2. Architectural Position
CHANGE INTENT
│
▼
CHANGE NORMALIZER
│
▼
IMPACT ANALYSIS
│
┌───────────┼───────────┐
│ │ │
TOPOLOGY SECURITY COMPATIBILITY
│ │ │
└───────────┼───────────┘
▼
PRE-CHANGE SIMULATION
│
▼
ROLLOUT PLAN
│
▼
SAFETY GATES
│
┌───────────┼───────────┐
│ │ │
CANARY EXPAND ABORT
│
▼
VERIFICATION
│
▼
COMPLETE
3. Core Separation
Keep distinct:
change intent
impact analysis
simulation
approval
rollout plan
execution
verification
rollback
post-change review
4. Non-Goals
Part 107 does not create:
a universal remote shell
change approval from user engagement metrics
per-user canary targeting
production experimentation without safety gates
automatic mutation of unrelated systems
5. Change Intent
Every change begins as structured intent.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeIntent { pub change_id: ChangeId, pub scope: ChangeScope, pub kind: ChangeKind, pub target_state: TargetStateRef, pub rationale: ChangeRationale, } }
6. Change Scope
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeScope { Service(ServiceId), Asset(AssetId), HostClass(HostClass), Region(RegionId), Tenant(TenantId), FederationPeer(FederationDomainId), GovernanceDomain(GovernanceDomainId), } }
7. No Global User Scope
Hard rule.
8. Change Kind
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeKind { DeployArtifact, UpdateConfiguration, UpdatePolicy, DatabaseMigration, KeyRotation, CertificateRotation, CapacityChange, NetworkChange, RegionalMigration, Failover, DependencyChange, FeatureEnablement, ServiceRetirement, } }
9. No Generic "RunCommand"
Hard rule.
10. Change Rationale
Typed.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeRationale { SecurityPatch, VulnerabilityRemediation, ReliabilityImprovement, CapacityAdjustment, CostOptimization, PrivacyRequirement, ComplianceRequirement, FeatureRelease, OperationalMaintenance, IncidentResponse, } }
11. Rationale Does Not Grant Authority
Hard rule.
12. Change Target State
Reference exact desired-state/config/release target.
13. Target State Ref
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum TargetStateRef { DesiredState(DesiredStateId), Release(ReleaseId), Policy(PolicyVersion), Migration(MigrationId), KeyEpoch(KeyEpoch), } }
14. No Ambiguous "Latest"
Hard rule.
15. Change Plan Identity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangePlanId(pub [u8; 16]); }
16. Immutable Change Plan
Once approved.
17. New modification creates new plan/version.
18. Hard rule.
19. Change Normalization
Inputs may originate from:
Git
release pipeline
security workflow
DR workflow
operator proposal
automation
20. Normalize into typed change model.
21. No free-form execution source becomes authority.
22. Hard rule.
23. Precondition Model
Every change declares preconditions.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangePreconditions { pub required_controls: Vec<ControlId>, pub required_capacity: Vec<CapacityRequirement>, pub required_dependencies: Vec<DependencyRequirement>, pub required_versions: Vec<VersionRequirement>, } }
24. Preconditions Must Be Verifiable
Hard rule.
25. Examples
backup fresh
replica healthy
minimum free capacity
compatible client version
no active critical incident
26. Change Preconditions Are Not Assumptions
They are gates.
27. Hard rule.
28. Impact Analysis
Impact analysis asks:
what may break if this change succeeds?
what may break if this change partially succeeds?
what may break if it fails?
29. Impact Dimensions
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ImpactDimension { Availability, Security, Privacy, DataIntegrity, Compatibility, Capacity, Cost, Residency, Recovery, Federation, } }
30. Impact Result
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeImpact { pub dimension: ImpactDimension, pub severity: ImpactSeverity, pub affected_scopes: Vec<ImpactScopeRef>, pub evidence: Vec<ImpactEvidenceRef>, } }
31. Impact Severity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ImpactSeverity { Negligible, Low, Medium, High, Critical, } }
32. Impact Is Not Probability
Hard rule.
33. Probability / Confidence Separate
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ImpactConfidence { Low, Medium, High, Verified, } }
34. Hard Rule
Do not collapse severity and confidence into one opaque score.
35. Dependency-Aware Impact Analysis
Use Part 106 graph.
36. Query:
dependencies(target)
dependents(target)
critical_paths(target)
blast_radius(target)
regional dependencies(target)
tenant-scoped dependencies(target)
37. Impact Graph
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeImpactGraph { pub origin: AssetId, pub affected_assets: Vec<AssetId>, pub affected_services: Vec<ServiceId>, pub critical_paths: Vec<DependencyPath>, } }
38. Graph Result Is Bounded
Hard rule.
39. No Full-Fleet Graph Dump By Default
Hard rule.
40. Dependency Criticality
Impact propagation respects:
Optional
Degradable
Required
Critical
41. Hard Rule
A connected edge is not automatically an outage path.
42. Redundancy Awareness
If dependency has:
active-active
active-passive
N-of-M
impact calculation reflects redundancy.
43. Hard rule.
44. Region-Aware Impact
Examples:
one region only
global control plane
tenant-dedicated region
45. No overstatement.
46. Hard rule.
47. Tenant-Aware Impact
If shared service changes:
which tenant scopes could be affected?
48. Do not expose tenant identities to unauthorized planners.
49. Hard rule.
50. Federation-Aware Impact
Change can affect:
peer compatibility
federation trust
routing
cross-domain protocol
51. Remote domain internal topology remains unknown.
52. Hard rule.
53. Impact Unknowns
Unknowns are explicit.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ImpactUnknown { pub reason: ImpactUnknownReason, pub scope: ChangeScope, } }
54. Unknown Reasons
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ImpactUnknownReason { StaleInventory, MissingDependencyData, UnsupportedSimulator, ExternalProviderOpaque, FederationTopologyUnavailable, } }
55. Unknown Does Not Mean Safe
Hard rule.
56. Change Risk
Risk should be explainable.
57. Risk Factors
blast radius
criticality
reversibility
data migration
security impact
privacy impact
dependency confidence
rollout scope
58. Change Risk Class
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeRiskClass { Low, Moderate, High, Critical, } }
59. No Black-Box ML Risk Score Baseline
Hard rule.
60. Risk Explanation
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeRiskExplanation { pub class: ChangeRiskClass, pub reasons: Vec<ChangeRiskReason>, } }
61. Example Reasons
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeRiskReason { LargeBlastRadius, IrreversibleMigration, SecurityControlChange, PrivacyPolicyChange, CrossRegionImpact, CriticalDependency, IncompleteInventory, RollbackUnavailable, } }
62. Safe.
63. Pre-Change Simulation
Simulation reduces uncertainty.
64. Simulation Types
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum SimulationType { StaticValidation, DependencySimulation, ConfigurationSimulation, MigrationDryRun, TrafficReplaySynthetic, FailoverSimulation, PolicyEvaluation, CapacitySimulation, } }
65. No Production User Traffic Replay
Hard rule.
66. Synthetic Replay
Use generated/sanitized workload models.
67. No raw private traffic capture.
68. Hard rule.
69. Static Validation
Checks:
schema
config invariants
policy compatibility
artifact signatures
version compatibility
70. Hard rule.
71. Dependency Simulation
Simulate:
target unavailable
dependency latency increase
region loss
72. Does not need user data.
73. Hard rule.
74. Configuration Simulation
Evaluate new desired state against:
hard invariants
tenant overlays
region policy
security floor
75. No production mutation.
76. Hard rule.
77. Database Migration Dry Run
Use isolated copy/synthetic schema/data subset where safe.
78. Validate:
schema transition
runtime duration
lock behavior
rollback possibility
79. No uncontrolled copy of private production data.
80. Hard rule.
81. Migration Simulation Data
Preferred:
synthetic
generated
redacted
isolated encrypted snapshot under strict scope
82. Hard rule.
83. Capacity Simulation
Use Part 101 models.
84. Questions:
Can remaining fleet handle canary drain?
Can region survive reduced capacity?
Will rollout exceed queue limits?
85. Good.
86. Failover Simulation
Part 100.
87. Verify target capacity/residency/fencing.
88. Hard rule.
89. Policy Simulation
Part 95/105.
90. Evaluate candidate policy against:
security
privacy
tenant
regional
authorization
91. Hard rule.
92. Simulation Result
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct SimulationResult { pub simulation: SimulationType, pub state: SimulationState, pub findings: Vec<SimulationFinding>, pub evidence_digest: Digest, } }
93. Simulation State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum SimulationState { Passed, Failed, Inconclusive, } }
94. Inconclusive ≠ Passed
Hard rule.
95. Simulation Evidence
Signed/immutable summary.
96. No mutable dashboard screenshot as sole evidence.
97. Hard rule.
98. Rollout Plan
Change execution must be staged when risk warrants.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct RolloutPlan { pub plan_id: ChangePlanId, pub phases: Vec<RolloutPhase>, pub abort_policy: AbortPolicy, pub rollback_policy: ChangeRollbackPolicy, } }
99. Rollout Phases
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum RolloutPhaseKind { Validation, Canary, SmallBatch, Regional, Broad, Complete, } }
100. Not every change needs all phases.
101. High-risk changes do.
102. Hard rule.
103. Rollout Phase
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct RolloutPhase { pub kind: RolloutPhaseKind, pub scope: RolloutScope, pub entry_gates: Vec<SafetyGate>, pub exit_gates: Vec<SafetyGate>, } }
104. Rollout Scope
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum RolloutScope { AssetSet(Vec<AssetId>), ServiceFraction { service: ServiceId, basis_points: u16 }, Region(RegionId), HostClass(HostClass), } }
105. No User-Based Rollout Scope
Hard rule.
106. Client Rollout
When client software:
local random bucket
platform
version range
107. No behavioral cohort.
108. Hard rule.
109. Canary Selection
Select by infrastructure partition.
110. Good examples:
one stateless instance
one shard replica
one noncritical region slice
111. Avoid:
VIP users
high-engagement users
political/geographic behavioral group
112. Hard rule.
113. Canary Requirements
Canary must be:
representative enough
small blast radius
observable
reversible where possible
114. Hard rule.
115. Safety Gates
A gate is a typed predicate.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum SafetyGate { Health(SloGate), Security(ControlGate), Privacy(PrivacyGate), Capacity(CapacityGate), Compatibility(CompatibilityGate), Residency(ResidencyGate), DataIntegrity(DataIntegrityGate), Recovery(RecoveryGateRef), } }
116. No Arbitrary Script Gate
Preferred hard rule.
117. Gate Result
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum GateResult { Pass, Fail, Unknown, } }
118. Unknown ≠ Pass
Hard rule.
119. Gate Evaluation
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct GateEvaluation { pub gate: SafetyGate, pub result: GateResult, pub evidence: Vec<EvidenceRef>, } }
120. Promotion Rule
All mandatory gates Pass.
121. Hard rule.
122. Promotion Decision
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum PromotionDecision { Promote, Hold, Abort, } }
123. Hold
Insufficient evidence or temporary uncertainty.
124. Hard rule.
125. Abort Policy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct AbortPolicy { pub critical_failures: Vec<AbortCondition>, pub max_error_budget_burn: Option<FixedPoint>, pub max_phase_duration: Option<Duration>, } }
126. Abort Conditions
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum AbortCondition { SecurityControlFailure, PrivacyViolation, DataIntegrityFailure, SloBreach, CapacitySaturation, UnexpectedDependencyFailure, MigrationError, } }
127. Hard Rule
Security/privacy/data-integrity failures cannot be overridden by a routine rollout operator.
128. Rollback Policy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeRollbackPolicy { AutomaticSafe, ApprovalRequired, ForwardFixOnly, NotPossible, } }
129. Rollback Must Be Honest
Hard rule.
130. Irreversible Migration
Use:
forward fix only
131. No fake rollback promise.
132. Hard rule.
133. Rollback Preconditions
Validate:
schema compatibility
security floor
artifact validity
data integrity
134. No rollback to vulnerable/revoked release.
135. Hard rule.
136. Rollback Target
Exact known state.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct RollbackTarget { pub desired_state: DesiredStateId, pub release: Option<ReleaseId>, pub security_epoch: ConfigurationSecurityEpoch, } }
137. No "previous" without exact identity.
138. Hard rule.
139. Safe Execution
Execution uses typed operators/adapters.
140. Example actions:
deploy exact artifact
apply signed config
perform migration
rotate cert
switch routing weight
141. No arbitrary shell execution in core.
142. Hard rule.
143. Execution Capability
Short-lived.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeExecutionCapability { pub change: ChangeId, pub scope: ChangeScope, pub actions: BTreeSet<ChangeExecutionAction>, pub expires_at: Timestamp, } }
144. Capability cannot outlive approved change window.
145. Hard rule.
146. Execution Action
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeExecutionAction { Deploy, ApplyConfig, Migrate, ShiftTraffic, RotateCredential, Restart, Rollback, Abort, } }
147. No Generic Root Action
Hard rule.
148. Change State Machine
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeExecutionState { Draft, Analyzing, Simulating, AwaitingApproval, Approved, Executing, Holding, Aborting, RollingBack, Verifying, Completed, Failed, } }
149. No Draft→Executing
Hard rule.
150. No Executing→Completed Without Verify
Hard rule.
151. Holding State
Useful when:
metrics ambiguous
dependency unstable
capacity uncertain
152. No forced promotion.
153. Hard rule.
154. Change Controller
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ChangeController { fn analyze( &self, intent: &ChangeIntent, ) -> Result<ChangeAnalysis, ChangeDecisionError>; fn execute( &self, capability: ChangeExecutionCapability, plan: &RolloutPlan, ) -> Result<ChangeExecutionReceipt, ChangeDecisionError>; } }
155. No Hidden Side Effects In Analysis
Hard rule.
156. Change Analysis
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeAnalysis { pub impacts: Vec<ChangeImpact>, pub risk: ChangeRiskExplanation, pub simulations: Vec<SimulationResult>, pub recommended_plan: RolloutPlan, } }
157. Recommended Plan Is Not Authority
Hard rule.
158. Human/Policy Approval
Part 104.
159. High-risk plan requires independent approval.
160. Hard rule.
161. Automated Low-Risk Change
Possible when policy pre-approves.
162. Example:
replace one unhealthy stateless instance
163. Still verify.
164. Hard rule.
165. Change Window
Optional.
166. Maintenance window used for nonurgent risky changes.
167. Emergency incident changes can bypass scheduling only.
168. Not safety/authorization.
169. Hard rule.
170. Dependency-Aware Ordering
Rollout order respects dependencies.
171. Example:
add backward-compatible DB schema
→ deploy consumers
→ deploy producers
→ remove old field later
172. Hard rule.
173. Expand-Migrate-Contract
Preferred for schema/API changes.
174. Avoid synchronized all-at-once cutovers.
175. Hard rule.
176. Protocol Compatibility
Part 52.
177. Rollout plan verifies mixed-version compatibility.
178. No broad rollout if old/new cannot coexist.
179. Hard rule.
180. Service Dependency Ordering
If B depends on A:
change A first only if backward compatible
otherwise:
prepare B first
181. Explicit.
182. Hard rule.
183. Key Rotation Rollout
Example:
publish new key
accept old+new
switch signing/encryption
confirm adoption
revoke old
184. No instant one-sided cutover if peers need compatibility.
185. Hard rule.
186. Certificate Rotation
Overlap window.
187. Validate trust chain.
188. No expired fallback.
189. Hard rule.
190. Regional Migration
Part 103.
191. Dependency-aware sequence:
provision destination
replicate
validate
shift reads
shift writes
verify
retire source
192. Residency gates throughout.
193. Hard rule.
194. Failover Change
Part 100.
195. Requires fencing.
196. Change plan must model reverse/failback separately.
197. Hard rule.
198. Capacity Change
Part 101.
199. Scale-in impact analysis important.
200. Check:
headroom
failover reserve
quorum
queue drain
201. Hard rule.
202. Cost Optimization Change
Part 102.
203. Rightsizing cannot bypass availability/security/privacy.
204. Hard rule.
205. Security Patch Change
Part 98/99.
206. Prioritize urgency but still verify artifact/signatures.
207. Emergency patch may shorten rollout phases.
208. Cannot bypass integrity/security gates.
209. Hard rule.
210. Privacy Policy Change
High-risk.
211. Requires privacy impact gate.
212. No experiment-first rollout.
213. Hard rule.
214. Authorization Policy Change
Part 81.
215. Simulate known allowed/denied cases.
216. Deny-all/allow-all accident prevention.
217. Hard rule.
218. Tenant Policy Change
Scope tenant only.
219. No cross-tenant rollout.
220. Hard rule.
221. Federation Change
Need peer compatibility.
222. Local domain controls own rollout.
223. No assumption remote peer upgrades simultaneously.
224. Hard rule.
225. Change Decision Provenance
Every decision records why.
226. Decision Record
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeDecisionRecord { pub change: ChangeId, pub decision: ChangeDecision, pub evidence: Vec<EvidenceRef>, pub policy_version: ChangePolicyVersion, } }
227. Change Decision
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeDecision { Approve, Hold, Reject, Abort, Rollback, } }
228. No Unexplained Manual Override
Hard rule.
229. Override
If allowed:
reason
scope
approver
expiry
230. Cannot override hard invariant.
231. Hard rule.
232. Privacy-Preserving Operational Decision Inputs
Allowed:
service health
resource saturation
dependency state
artifact/version
policy/control status
region state
233. Forbidden baseline:
message content
contact graph
search history
feed engagement
per-user behavior
234. Hard rule.
235. User Impact Measurement
Can use aggregate service SLOs.
236. Example:
error rate
latency
connection success
237. No user-level cohort analysis required.
238. Hard rule.
239. Change Evaluation Telemetry
Aggregate by:
service
region
phase
work class
240. No stable user IDs.
241. Hard rule.
242. Client Change Validation
For app rollout:
crash rate
startup success
sync success
aggregate.
243. No behavioral engagement metrics.
244. Hard rule.
245. Change Guardrails
A guardrail is not optimization.
246. Security/privacy guardrails are mandatory.
247. Hard rule.
248. Guardrail Classes
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum GuardrailClass { HardInvariant, Security, Privacy, Reliability, Capacity, Compatibility, Cost, } }
249. Precedence
HardInvariant
> Security/Privacy
> DataIntegrity
> Reliability
> Capacity
> Cost
250. Hard rule.
251. Guardrail Violation
Immediate abort for:
hard invariant
security
privacy
data integrity
252. Hold or rollback for reliability/capacity depending severity.
253. Hard rule.
254. Change Budget
Prevent too many simultaneous changes.
255. Change Concurrency Policy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeConcurrencyPolicy { pub max_changes_per_service: u8, pub max_changes_per_region: u8, pub conflict_classes: Vec<ChangeConflictClass>, } }
256. Avoid overlapping risky changes.
257. Hard rule.
258. Change Conflict
Examples:
DB migration + schema-dependent deploy
regional failover + capacity scale-in
key rotation + federation protocol change
259. Hard rule.
260. Change Lock
Logical scoped lock.
261. No global fleet lock unless necessary.
262. Hard rule.
263. Change Freeze
Part 104.
264. Freeze blocks routine/high-risk change.
265. Emergency policy can override scheduling.
266. Hard rule.
267. Change Dependency
Changes themselves may depend on other changes.
268. Change DAG
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeDependency { pub change: ChangeId, pub depends_on: ChangeId, } }
269. No cycles.
270. Hard rule.
271. Change DAG Validation
Topological order.
272. No execution if unresolved predecessor.
273. Hard rule.
274. Rollout Pause
Operator/policy can pause between phases.
275. Paused state retains exact current phase.
276. No hidden background expansion.
277. Hard rule.
278. Abort
Abort stops further rollout.
279. Does not necessarily rollback already changed assets.
280. Explicit distinction.
281. Hard rule.
282. Abort vs Rollback
Abort = stop progressing
Rollback = actively return state
283. Hard rule.
284. Partial Rollout
Must remain explicitly represented.
285. PartiallyApplied should not be reported as completed.
286. Hard rule.
287. Change Coverage State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeCoverageState { NotStarted, Partial, Complete, RolledBack, } }
288. Good.
289. Post-Change Verification
Check:
desired state converged
health stable
security controls pass
privacy controls pass
no new critical drift
capacity healthy
290. Hard rule.
291. Verification Window
Need soak time for some changes.
292. Example:
15 min
1 hour
24 hours
293. Policy based.
294. No instant complete if issue may be delayed.
295. Hard rule.
296. Soak State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum SoakState { NotRequired, Running, Passed, Failed, } }
297. High-risk release often needs soak.
298. Hard rule.
299. Post-Change Drift Check
Part 105.
300. Ensure actual state matches target.
301. Hard rule.
302. Post-Change Inventory Check
Part 106.
303. Ensure expected assets/dependencies exist.
304. Hard rule.
305. Post-Change Vulnerability Check
Part 98.
306. Ensure target artifact is not blocked/vulnerable.
307. Hard rule.
308. Post-Change Compliance Check
Part 95.
309. Critical controls pass.
310. Hard rule.
311. Change Execution Receipt
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeExecutionReceipt { pub change: ChangeId, pub result: ChangeExecutionResult, pub final_state_digest: Digest, pub verification_digest: Digest, } }
312. Result
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeExecutionResult { Completed, Aborted, RolledBack, Failed, } }
313. No Completed Without Verification Digest
Hard rule.
314. Change Evidence Bundle
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ChangeEvidenceBundle { pub change: ChangeId, pub analysis_digest: Digest, pub simulation_digest: Digest, pub approval_digest: Digest, pub execution_digest: Digest, pub verification_digest: Digest, } }
315. Signed/immutable summary.
316. Good for audit/compliance.
317. Hard rule.
318. Audit Integration
Part 94.
319. Audit:
high-risk change approved
execution started
abort/rollback
completion
override
320. Not every metric sample.
321. Hard rule.
322. Compliance Integration
Part 95.
323. Controls:
change analyzed
required simulation passed
approval threshold met
rollback/forward-fix policy exists
post-change verification passed
324. Hard rule.
325. Incident Integration
Part 96.
326. Failed/high-risk change can open incident.
327. Incident may freeze further rollout.
328. Hard rule.
329. SOC Integration
Part 97.
330. Unexpected post-change security signal may abort.
331. No user behavior input.
332. Hard rule.
333. Vulnerability Integration
Part 98.
334. Security remediation changes can be prioritized.
335. Still undergo integrity/compatibility checks.
336. Hard rule.
337. Update Integration
Part 99.
338. Software rollout is one class of change.
339. Exact artifact promotion.
340. Hard rule.
341. DR Integration
Part 100.
342. Failover/failback changes use recovery gates.
343. Hard rule.
344. Capacity Integration
Part 101.
345. Capacity simulation/gates prevent overload during rollout.
346. Hard rule.
347. FinOps Integration
Part 102.
348. Cost impact can inform plan.
349. Cannot override security/privacy.
350. Hard rule.
351. Geographic Governance Integration
Part 103.
352. Region migration/placement change requires residency gate.
353. Hard rule.
354. Organizational Governance Integration
Part 104.
355. Approval/execution authority from scoped roles.
356. Hard rule.
357. Desired-State Integration
Part 105.
358. Change target becomes new signed desired state.
359. Execution reconciles toward target.
360. Hard rule.
361. Inventory Integration
Part 106.
362. Impact analysis uses canonical topology.
363. Post-change inventory confirms actual dependencies/assets.
364. Hard rule.
365. Change Decision Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ChangeDecisionService { fn assess( &self, intent: &ChangeIntent, ) -> Result<ChangeAnalysis, ChangeDecisionError>; fn promotion_decision( &self, phase: &RolloutPhase, gates: &[GateEvaluation], ) -> PromotionDecision; } }
366. Simulation Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ChangeSimulationService { fn simulate( &self, intent: &ChangeIntent, simulations: &[SimulationType], ) -> Result<Vec<SimulationResult>, ChangeDecisionError>; } }
367. Rollout Planner
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait RolloutPlanner { fn plan( &self, intent: &ChangeIntent, analysis: &ChangeAnalysis, ) -> Result<RolloutPlan, ChangeDecisionError>; } }
368. Change Executor
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait SafeChangeExecutor { fn execute_phase( &self, capability: &ChangeExecutionCapability, phase: &RolloutPhase, ) -> Result<PhaseExecutionResult, ChangeDecisionError>; } }
369. No General Remote Exec
Hard rule.
370. Change Error Taxonomy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeDecisionError { InvalidIntent, ScopeViolation, ImpactUnknown, SimulationFailed, SimulationInconclusive, SafetyGateFailed, ApprovalMissing, RolloutConflict, RollbackUnavailable, ExecutionFailed, VerificationFailed, Unauthorized, Internal, } }
371. Operational Decision Privacy
Store only:
change
scope
evidence
decision
372. Not:
operator browsing behavior
user impact by identity
private message samples
373. Hard rule.
374. Decision Retention
High-risk change decisions longer.
375. Low-risk routine changes shorter.
376. No permanent raw metric archive.
377. Hard rule.
378. Decision Explainability
Every reject/hold/abort includes typed reason.
379. No opaque "AI says risky."
380. Hard rule.
381. AI Assistance
Can summarize:
impact graph
simulation findings
runbook references
382. AI is advisory only.
383. It cannot approve/execute high-risk changes.
384. Hard rule.
385. AI Inputs
Use infrastructure/change evidence only.
386. No user behavioral data.
387. Hard rule.
388. Pre-Change Checklist
Machine-checkable where possible.
389. Example:
backup verified
rollback target valid
capacity headroom sufficient
all mandatory gates evaluable
390. Hard rule.
391. Change Readiness State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ChangeReadiness { Ready, ReadyWithWarnings, Blocked, Unknown, } }
392. Unknown is not Ready.
393. Hard rule.
394. Change Freeze After Failure
Repeated failed changes can trigger temporary freeze.
395. Scope-limited.
396. No global freeze by default.
397. Hard rule.
398. Failure Learning
Feed:
tests
simulators
runbooks
impact rules
399. Do not feed employee performance scoring.
400. Hard rule.
401. Change Success Metrics
Safe aggregate:
success rate
rollback rate
abort rate
mean verification time
402. Aggregate by:
service
change class
risk class
403. No individual operator leaderboard.
404. Hard rule.
405. Change SLOs
Examples:
impact-analysis freshness
approval latency
rollback readiness
verification completion time
406. Security SLO
0 security/privacy hard-gate bypass
0 execution without valid capability
0 rollback to blocked artifact
407. Privacy SLO
0 user-level rollout targeting
0 private-content replay in simulation
0 behavioral metrics in promotion gates
408. Failure Modes
stale topology
simulation unavailable
partial rollout
gate telemetry outage
rollback failure
409. Stale Topology
Impact confidence reduced.
410. High-risk change may block.
411. Hard rule.
412. Simulation Unavailable
Result Inconclusive.
413. High-risk change does not automatically proceed.
414. Hard rule.
415. Partial Rollout
Hold/rollback/forward-fix per policy.
416. Do not report complete.
417. Hard rule.
418. Gate Telemetry Outage
Gate = Unknown.
419. Mandatory gate prevents promotion.
420. Hard rule.
421. Rollback Failure
Escalate to incident.
422. Freeze expansion.
423. Forward-fix only under incident-approved plan.
424. Hard rule.
425. Testing
Need change-decision testkit.
426. Test Scenarios
stateless deployment
DB migration
key rotation
regional migration
security patch
427. Intent Test
Unsupported/free-form action rejected.
428. Scope Test
Change cannot affect outside approved scope.
429. Impact Test
Critical dependency appears in impact graph.
430. Redundancy Test
Redundant path lowers blast radius correctly.
431. Unknown Test
Stale topology yields Unknown/low confidence.
432. Simulation Test
Failed simulation blocks mandatory gate.
433. Inconclusive Test
Inconclusive != Passed.
434. Canary Test
Rollout starts with intended infrastructure slice.
435. Privacy Test
No user behavior can be used as canary selector.
436. Gate Test
Unknown mandatory gate blocks promotion.
437. Abort Test
Security violation immediately stops expansion.
438. Rollback Test
Blocked old release cannot be rollback target.
439. Irreversible Migration Test
Policy correctly marks forward-fix only.
440. Partial Rollout Test
State remains Partial until reconciled.
441. Tenant Test
Tenant-scoped change cannot touch others.
442. Federation Test
Local rollout does not assume remote upgrade.
443. Region Test
Residency constraint blocks forbidden rollout.
444. Capacity Test
Insufficient headroom blocks expansion.
445. DR Test
Failover change requires fencing/recovery gate.
446. Approval Test
High-risk change requires independent roles.
447. Audit Test
Decision/evidence bundle verifies.
448. Fuzzing
Fuzz:
change intent
impact graph
simulation result
rollout plan
safety gate
449. Property Tests
Properties:
mandatory failed/unknown safety gate can never produce Promote
change execution capability can never authorize outside approved scope
rollback target below security floor can never be selected
user identity can never become a valid infrastructure rollout selector
450. Formal Verification Targets
Strong candidates:
change state machine
promotion gate semantics
rollout/abort/rollback ordering
change DAG
451. Kani Candidate
gate precedence and rollback invariants.
452. TLA+ Candidate
analyze → simulate → approve → canary → expand → verify → complete/abort/rollback.
453. Loom Candidate
concurrent gate failure + promotion decision + execution transition.
454. Performance
Impact analysis should avoid full-graph scans.
455. Use bounded graph projections.
456. Cache stable dependency summaries.
457. Hard rule.
458. Simulation Cost
Potentially expensive.
459. Run asynchronously.
460. No blocking user request path.
461. Hard rule.
462. Gate Evaluation
Fast enough for phase promotion.
463. Aggregate/precomputed metrics.
464. Hard rule.
465. Storage
Separate stores:
change intents
impact analyses
simulation results
rollout plans
gate evaluations
execution receipts
decision records
466. No user event warehouse.
467. Hard rule.
468. Partitioning
By:
service
asset
region
tenant
federation domain
change class
469. No user partition.
470. Hard rule.
471. Crate Layout
Recommended:
crates/
├── siar-change-core/
├── siar-change-impact/
├── siar-change-risk/
├── siar-change-simulation/
├── siar-rollout-planner/
├── siar-safety-gate/
├── siar-safe-executor/
├── siar-change-rollback/
├── siar-change-evidence/
├── siar-change-observability/
└── siar-change-testkit/
472. siar-change-core
Owns:
ChangeIntent
ChangeScope
ChangeKind
ChangeState
errors
473. siar-change-impact
Dependency/topology-aware impact analysis.
474. siar-change-risk
Explainable risk classification.
475. siar-change-simulation
Static/dependency/migration/capacity/policy simulation.
476. siar-rollout-planner
Canary/batch/region/broad rollout plans.
477. siar-safety-gate
Typed health/security/privacy/capacity/compatibility gates.
478. siar-safe-executor
Scoped execution actions and phase transitions.
479. siar-change-rollback
Rollback/forward-fix policy validation.
480. siar-change-evidence
Immutable decision/execution evidence bundles.
481. siar-change-observability
Aggregate change health only.
482. siar-change-testkit
impact/simulation/rollout/privacy tests.
483. Security, Privacy & Correctness Invariants
Mandatory:
1. Every production change is represented as structured intent with an exact scope, kind, target state, rationale, and verifiable preconditions; arbitrary remote commands are not first-class change primitives.
2. Impact analysis uses typed infrastructure dependencies, criticality, redundancy, regions, tenants, and federation boundaries and never requires user behavior, private content, social graphs, or communication histories.
3. Unknown or stale topology, failed simulation, and unavailable mandatory gate evidence can never be silently interpreted as safe.
4. Pre-change simulation uses synthetic, generated, sanitized, or tightly isolated technical data; raw private production traffic/content is not a baseline simulation input.
5. Rollout plans use infrastructure-based canaries and phases, never behavioral user cohorts or stable user identity as operational selectors.
6. Promotion requires every mandatory safety gate to pass; failed or unknown security, privacy, data-integrity, compatibility, residency, or recovery gates block progression.
7. Abort and rollback are distinct operations; partial rollout remains explicitly partial until reconciled, rolled back, or successfully completed.
8. Rollback can never restore a revoked, vulnerable, incompatible, privacy-weakened, or below-security-floor release/configuration merely because it was previously deployed.
9. High-risk change execution requires scoped short-lived authority and independent approvals according to Part 104 separation-of-duties rules.
10. Change completion requires post-change verification, desired-state convergence, inventory reconciliation, and required soak/health checks; execution success alone is insufficient.
11. Change telemetry, simulations, decision records, dashboards, and reports contain aggregate technical/service data only and cannot become user-behavior or employee-performance surveillance systems.
12. Change impact and execution integrate with topology, desired state, vulnerability management, updates, DR, capacity, FinOps, residency, organizational governance, audit, compliance, SOC, and incident response without creating an alternate path around security/privacy invariants.
484. Initial Production Scope
Implement first:
typed ChangeIntent/ChangeScope/ChangeKind
exact TargetStateRef
change preconditions
dependency-aware impact analysis
explainable risk classification
static/config/policy simulation
database migration dry-run support
capacity simulation
rollout plan model
infrastructure canary selection
typed safety gates
promotion/hold/abort decisions
scoped execution capabilities
abort vs rollback separation
rollback target validation
post-change convergence/inventory verification
change evidence bundle
audit/compliance integration
privacy-safe change metrics
change-decision testkit
Then add:
advanced topology simulation
fault-injection-driven pre-change validation
probabilistic impact confidence models using infrastructure-only data
formal rollout/rollback verification
cross-federation compatibility simulation
automatic safe-plan synthesis constrained by policy
485. Definition of Done
Part 107 is complete when:
- all production changes are typed and scope-bound
- exact target state is explicit
- topology-aware impact analysis exists
- unknown impact is surfaced
- simulations are privacy-safe
- high-risk changes require evidence/approval
- canaries are infrastructure-based
- mandatory gates use Pass/Fail/Unknown semantics
- abort and rollback are separate
- rollback below security/privacy floors is impossible
- partial rollout remains visible
- post-change verification includes desired-state and inventory reconciliation
- decision provenance is immutable
- change telemetry contains no behavioral user targeting
- impact/simulation/rollout/rollback/privacy/fuzz/formal tests are specified
486. Final Architecture
CHANGE INTENT
│
▼
IMPACT ANALYSIS
│
┌────────────┼────────────┐
│ │ │
TOPOLOGY SECURITY CAPACITY
│ │ │
└────────────┼────────────┘
▼
PRE-CHANGE SIMULATION
│
▼
ROLLOUT PLAN
│
▼
APPROVAL
│
▼
CANARY
│
SAFETY GATES
┌──────────┼──────────┐
│ │ │
PROMOTE HOLD ABORT
│ │
▼ ▼
EXPAND ROLLBACK
│
▼
VERIFY
│
▼
COMPLETE
Change-safety model:
typed intent
+
dependency-aware impact
+
pre-change simulation
+
infrastructure canaries
+
mandatory safety gates
+
scoped authority
+
abort/rollback discipline
+
post-change verification
not:
push the change everywhere, watch a dashboard, and hope the error rate does not rise
487. Final Principle
A production change should be treated as a hypothesis about a complex dependency graph—not as a command to execute blindly.
The correct model is:
state the intent
+
understand dependencies
+
simulate before mutation
+
start small
+
promote only on evidence
+
abort quickly on hard failures
+
rollback only when safe
+
verify the final state
+
never use private user behavior as operational change control
This architecture gives SIAR a privacy-preserving operational decision foundation for impact analysis, rollout planning, pre-change simulation, safe execution, abort/rollback, topology-aware canaries, and evidence-backed production changes while preserving the anonymity, local-first, least-authority, and anti-surveillance guarantees established across Parts 34–106.