Core System Architecture Part 144 — Anonymous Network Extension Testing, Certification, Compatibility Matrix, Sandbox Validation, Fault Injection, Security/Privacy Qualification & Release Evidence Architecture
SIAR — Secure, Local-First, Multi-Transport Communication Platform
Series: Core System Architecture
Part: 144
Status: Architecture specification
Primary language: Rust
Builds on: Core System Architecture Parts 64, 73, 94–99, 108, 122–126, 129–143
Primary purpose: define SIAR's extension-assurance architecture for test governance, sandbox qualification, compatibility matrices, conformance tests, security/privacy verification, fault injection, migration/update validation, exact-artifact certification, release evidence, evidence freshness, revocation, and privacy-preserving qualification.
1. Purpose
An extension should not be trusted merely because:
it compiles
its developer says it works
it passed one test run
it has a valid signature
Production trust requires evidence.
A mature extension-assurance architecture must answer:
What exactly was tested?
Against which host/SDK/protocol versions?
Which package digest was tested?
Which capabilities and data flows were exercised?
Were failure and revocation paths tested?
Did the sandbox match production constraints?
Is the evidence still fresh?
Can certification be suspended or revoked?
The governing principle is:
SIAR extension qualification must bind test evidence to an exact package, dependency graph, compatibility baseline, capability/data-flow scope, and environment, while treating Unknown, stale, skipped, or mismatched evidence as non-passing.
2. Architectural Position
EXTENSION PACKAGE
│
▼
QUALIFICATION PLAN
│
┌────────────┼────────────┐
│ │ │
TESTS SANDBOX COMPAT MATRIX
│ │ │
└────────────┼────────────┘
▼
EVIDENCE PACKAGE
│
▼
CERTIFICATION
│
▼
RELEASE / MARKETPLACE GATE
3. Core Separation
Keep distinct:
test execution
verification evidence
qualification
certification
release authorization
marketplace publication
runtime activation
4. Non-Goals
Part 144 does not create:
one global quality score
self-certification by extension code
“green CI means safe”
certification based on screenshots
permanent certification with no invalidation
5. Qualification Identity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionQualificationId(pub [u8; 16]); }
6. Qualification Scope
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionQualificationScope { pub extension: ExtensionId, pub version: ExtensionVersion, pub package: ExtensionPackageId, pub lockfile_digest: Digest, pub sbom_digest: Digest, } }
7. Hard Rule
Qualification binds an exact artifact and dependency graph.
8. Qualification Class
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionAssuranceClass { Standard, Privileged, HighRisk, HighAssurance, } }
9. Hard Rule
Assurance class derives from capabilities/data/runtime class, not publisher popularity.
10. Qualification State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionQualificationState { Draft, Planning, Executing, EvidenceReview, Qualified, Conditional, Rejected, Suspended, Revoked, Superseded, } }
11. No Draft→Qualified Direct
Hard rule.
12. Qualification Plan
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionQualificationPlan { pub qualification: ExtensionQualificationId, pub scope: ExtensionQualificationScope, pub assurance_class: ExtensionAssuranceClass, pub required_methods: BTreeSet<ExtensionVerificationMethod>, } }
13. Verification Method
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionVerificationMethod { Unit, Property, Fuzz, Integration, Contract, EndToEnd, Compatibility, SandboxValidation, FaultInjection, Benchmark, StaticAnalysis, SecurityReview, PrivacyReview, MigrationTest, UpdateRollbackTest, FormalVerification, OperationalExercise, } }
14. Hard Rule
Required methods come from policy matrix.
15. Verification Matrix
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionVerificationMatrix { pub assurance_class: ExtensionAssuranceClass, pub rows: Vec<ExtensionVerificationRequirement>, } }
16. Verification Requirement
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionVerificationRequirement { pub domain: ExtensionAssuranceDomain, pub required_methods: BTreeSet<ExtensionVerificationMethod>, } }
17. Assurance Domain
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionAssuranceDomain { Functional, Security, Privacy, Compatibility, Reliability, Performance, ResourceIsolation, DataLifecycle, UpdateMigration, Accessibility, Operability, } }
18. Hard Rule
No one percentage replaces multidimensional assurance.
19. Obligation State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionVerificationObligationState { Required, Planned, Implemented, Passed, Failed, Inconclusive, Waived, NotApplicable, } }
20. Hard Rule
Inconclusive and NotApplicable are not Passed.
21. Waiver
Only where policy permits.
22. Hard Rule
Hard security/privacy requirements cannot be waived.
23. Test Identity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionTestId(pub [u8; 16]); }
24. Test Intent
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionTestDescriptor { pub id: ExtensionTestId, pub intent: String, pub domain: ExtensionAssuranceDomain, pub method: ExtensionVerificationMethod, } }
25. Hard Rule
Test name alone is not sufficient evidence; intent and scope are explicit.
26. Test Result
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionTestResult { Passed, Failed, Inconclusive, Skipped, } }
27. Hard Rule
Retries do not erase initial failure evidence.
28. Flaky Test State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionFlakeState { Stable, Suspected, Confirmed, Quarantined, } }
29. Hard Rule
Quarantined flaky test cannot satisfy mandatory qualification evidence.
30. Test Environment Identity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionTestEnvironmentId(pub [u8; 16]); }
31. Environment Descriptor
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionTestEnvironment { pub host_version: Version, pub sdk_version: SdkVersion, pub protocol_versions: BTreeMap<ProtocolId, ProtocolVersion>, pub platform: PlatformClass, pub architecture: CpuArchitecture, pub privacy_mode: PrivacyRoutingMode, } }
32. Hard Rule
Evidence records exact environment.
33. Environment Fidelity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum EnvironmentFidelity { Synthetic, Representative, ProductionEquivalent, } }
34. Hard Rule
Synthetic is never mislabeled ProductionEquivalent.
35. Sandbox Validation
Sandbox is part of qualification.
36. Sandbox Goals
Validate:
runtime isolation
capability boundaries
network/file/device mediation
resource quotas
event/IPC behavior
revocation
background execution
37. Hard Rule
Sandbox uses synthetic data by default.
38. No Production User Data
Hard rule.
39. Certification Sandbox
Can mirror production policies/limits more closely.
40. Hard Rule
Still isolated from production user data/control plane.
41. Sandbox Fixture Set
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionQualificationFixtureSet { pub fixture_set: FixturePackageId, pub digest: Digest, pub version: FixtureVersion, } }
42. Hard Rule
Fixtures versioned and deterministic where possible.
43. Compatibility Matrix
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionCompatibilityMatrix { pub extension: ExtensionId, pub rows: Vec<ExtensionCompatibilityMatrixRow>, } }
44. Matrix Row
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionCompatibilityMatrixRow { pub host_version: VersionRange<Version>, pub sdk_version: VersionRange<SdkVersion>, pub platform: PlatformClass, pub architecture: CpuArchitecture, pub state: CompatibilityState, } }
45. Compatibility State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum CompatibilityState { Supported, SupportedWithLimitations, Unsupported, Unknown, } }
46. Hard Rule
Unknown is not Supported.
47. Privacy Mode Compatibility
Matrix also considers:
Standard
Private
Anonymous
MaximumAnonymity
where extension behavior differs.
48. Hard Rule
Standard-mode compatibility does not imply MaximumAnonymity compatibility.
49. Platform Matrix
At minimum consider:
Linux desktop
Windows desktop
macOS desktop
Android
where supported.
50. Hard Rule
Unsupported platform is explicit, not silently degraded.
51. Host ABI Matrix
Native/shared modules require host ABI qualification.
52. Hard Rule
ABI compatibility is exact/explicit.
53. SDK/API Matrix
Part 129/130 compatibility registry supplies baselines.
54. Hard Rule
SDK version support must match generated binding/runtime reality.
55. Peer Extension Compatibility
Where peer dependencies exist.
56. Hard Rule
Peer version skew must be tested or blocked.
57. Conformance Testing
Conformance verifies stable contract behavior.
58. Conformance Domains
host calls
events
errors
capabilities
permission denials
data-flow behavior
stream semantics
background scheduling
59. Hard Rule
Conformance tests include negative behavior.
60. Negative Tests
Examples:
undeclared file read rejected
revoked capability denied
oversized IPC rejected
external sink denied
stale action token rejected
61. Hard Rule
Security posture requires proving denial paths.
62. Property Testing
Good for invariants:
scope attenuation
bounded queues
state merge
tombstone dominance
idempotency
63. Hard Rule
Property tests use reproducible seeds on failure.
64. Fuzzing
Fuzz extension-facing parsers:
manifests
IPC envelopes
UI schemas
job payloads
state sync
update manifests
65. Hard Rule
Fuzz crash corpus retained as regression inputs.
66. Static Analysis
Includes:
unsafe Rust review
dependency policies
forbidden APIs
manifest consistency
67. Hard Rule
Static analysis supplements runtime testing.
68. Security Qualification
Security review checks:
capability boundaries
sandbox escape attempts
secret handling
IPC authentication
update/revocation handling
dependency provenance
69. Hard Rule
Security certification is package-version scoped.
70. Privacy Qualification
Privacy review checks:
data minimization
source→sink controls
retention/deletion
anonymous-mode behavior
telemetry
notification/UI exposure
71. Hard Rule
Privacy qualification includes negative evidence such as “data unavailable/denied” paths.
72. Data Lifecycle Qualification
Validate:
retention expiry
uninstall cleanup
derived data deletion
backup/restore anti-resurrection
export behavior
73. Hard Rule
Data deletion qualification includes caches/indexes/embeddings/previews where relevant.
74. Update/Migration Qualification
Part 143.
Validate:
migration
checkpoint
rollback
hot/cold upgrade
version skew
crash-loop recovery
75. Hard Rule
Update certification binds migration manifest.
76. Resource-Isolation Qualification
Validate:
CPU quota
memory quota
network quota
storage quota
queue bounds
background wake budget
77. Hard Rule
Extension cannot pass if resource isolation repeatedly fails.
78. Fault Injection
First-class qualification method.
79. Fault Classes
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionFaultClass { RuntimeCrash, HostRestart, NetworkLoss, StorageFull, PermissionRevoked, DependencyUnavailable, ClockSkew, QueueSaturation, PartialWrite, ProcessKill, } }
80. Hard Rule
Fault injection remains bounded and sandboxed.
81. No Production Fault Injection By Default
Hard rule.
82. Fault Scenario
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionFaultScenario { pub class: ExtensionFaultClass, pub timing: FaultTiming, pub expected_invariant: String, } }
83. Hard Rule
Fault scenario declares what must remain true.
84. Crash Injection
Verify:
host remains alive
extension quarantines/restarts safely
no duplicate side effect
85. Permission Revocation Injection
Verify in-flight operations revalidate.
86. Hard Rule
Revoked authority cannot commit after revocation boundary.
87. Storage Full Injection
Verify:
bounded failure
no corruption
no hidden data loss
88. Queue Saturation Injection
Verify backpressure/coalescing.
89. Hard Rule
No unbounded allocation.
90. Network Partition Injection
Verify offline/local-first behavior.
91. Hard Rule
No privacy downgrade.
92. Clock Skew Injection
Verify:
replay protection
expiry logic
job schedules
93. Hard Rule
Wall-clock skew cannot bypass security expiry.
94. Adversarial Validation
For HighRisk/HighAssurance extensions.
95. Adversary Goals
Examples:
escape sandbox
exfiltrate denied data
enumerate contacts
reuse stale capability
spoof core UI
abuse notification channel
96. Hard Rule
Adversarial tests operate only on synthetic/private test environments.
97. Performance Qualification
Measure:
startup
host-call latency
memory footprint
CPU budget
stream throughput
UI patch rate
background idle behavior
98. Hard Rule
Performance failure cannot justify weakening security/privacy controls.
99. Benchmark Environment
Exact toolchain/hardware/environment recorded.
100. Hard Rule
Do not compare incompatible benchmark environments as equal.
101. Accessibility Qualification
For UI extensions.
102. Validate:
semantic roles
keyboard
screen reader
contrast
text scaling
reduced motion
103. Hard Rule
Accessibility qualification is part of production readiness where UI exists.
104. Operational Qualification
Validate:
install
disable
uninstall
update
rollback
quarantine
diagnostics
export
105. Hard Rule
Lifecycle operations are tested, not assumed.
106. Evidence Identity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionEvidenceId(pub Digest); }
107. Evidence Record
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionVerificationEvidence { pub evidence_id: ExtensionEvidenceId, pub qualification: ExtensionQualificationId, pub method: ExtensionVerificationMethod, pub environment: ExtensionTestEnvironmentId, pub result: ExtensionTestResult, pub artifact_digest: Digest, } }
108. Hard Rule
Evidence binds exact artifact digest.
109. Evidence Provenance
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionEvidenceProvenance { pub source_revision: RevisionId, pub runner_identity: RunnerIdentity, pub toolchain_digest: Digest, pub generated_at: Timestamp, } }
110. Hard Rule
Evidence without provenance cannot satisfy high-assurance gate.
111. CI Evidence
Signed by CI workload identity.
112. Hard Rule
Developer laptop identity is not CI attestation.
113. Manual Evidence
Allowed for review/inspection.
114. Hard Rule
Manual evidence records reviewer role/scope, not employee performance.
115. Evidence Freshness
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum EvidenceFreshness { Fresh, Stale, Invalidated, } }
116. Invalidation Reasons
package changed
dependency changed
permission changed
data flow changed
host compatibility changed
test environment changed materially
security advisory
117. Hard Rule
Stale evidence cannot satisfy mandatory current qualification.
118. Selective Requalification
Allowed where unchanged evidence remains valid.
119. Hard Rule
Reuse is dependency-aware and traceable, not AI-guessed.
120. Qualification Package
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionQualificationPackage { pub qualification: ExtensionQualificationId, pub scope: ExtensionQualificationScope, pub matrix: ExtensionVerificationMatrix, pub evidence: Vec<ExtensionEvidenceId>, pub compatibility_matrix: CompatibilityMatrixId, } }
121. Hard Rule
Package immutable after certification decision.
122. Qualification Decision
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionQualificationDecision { Qualified, Conditional, Rejected, } }
123. Conditional Qualification
Only for non-hard gaps.
124. Hard Rule
Conditions are explicit, scoped, and time-bounded.
125. Certification Identity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionCertificationId(pub [u8; 16]); }
126. Certification State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionCertificationState { Draft, Certified, ConditionallyCertified, Suspended, Revoked, Superseded, } }
127. Hard Rule
Revoked certification cannot be treated as Certified by older clients.
128. Certification Authorities
Possible scoped authorities:
ReleaseEngineering
SecurityAssurance
PrivacyAssurance
PlatformCompatibility
MarketplaceGovernance
129. Hard Rule
No universal single approver for high-risk extension.
130. Multi-Authority Certification
High-risk extension may require several attestations.
131. Hard Rule
Security/privacy attestation cannot be substituted by product approval.
132. Certification Record
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionCertificationRecord { pub certification: ExtensionCertificationId, pub qualification: ExtensionQualificationId, pub package: ExtensionPackageId, pub state: ExtensionCertificationState, pub attestations: Vec<ExtensionCertificationAttestation>, } }
133. Hard Rule
Certification references immutable qualification/evidence.
134. Certification Scope
Can be limited by:
platform
host version
privacy mode
capability set
tenant type
135. Hard Rule
“Certified” is never context-free.
136. Certification Suspension
Triggers:
new critical vulnerability
evidence invalidation
sandbox escape
privacy incident
compatibility break
137. Hard Rule
Suspension blocks new privileged deployment according to policy.
138. Certification Revocation
Permanent for that certification record.
139. Hard Rule
Re-certification creates new record.
140. Release Evidence Archive
Part 126 integration.
141. Evidence Archive Includes
qualification package
certification record
compatibility matrix
test/fuzz reports
migration evidence
SBOM/provenance
revocation state
142. Hard Rule
Archive content-addressed and append-only/supersession-based.
143. Release Evidence Package
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionReleaseEvidencePackage { pub package: ExtensionPackageId, pub certification: ExtensionCertificationId, pub qualification: ExtensionQualificationId, pub artifact_digest: Digest, pub lockfile_digest: Digest, } }
144. Hard Rule
Release evidence must match actual distributed package.
145. Promotion Gate
Marketplace/release system checks:
package digest
certification state
qualification freshness
compatibility
revocation
146. Hard Rule
No package promotion on stale certification.
147. Exact Artifact Promotion
Build once, qualify exact artifact, promote same digest.
148. Hard Rule
No rebuild after certification.
149. Rebuild
Creates a new artifact requiring identity/evidence reconciliation.
150. Hard Rule
Same source revision is not same artifact.
151. Sandbox-to-Production Promotion
Environment changes, artifact does not.
152. Hard Rule
Do not substitute a differently built production artifact.
153. Marketplace Trust Signal
May show factual status:
Certified
Certification scope
Last qualified version
SBOM available
Reproducible build
154. Hard Rule
No one “trust score”.
155. Certification UI
Should explain:
what was certified
for which version/platform
which capabilities
expiration/suspension state
156. Hard Rule
No vague “safe” claim.
157. Compatibility Certification
Part 129 interoperability certification.
158. Hard Rule
Extension certification does not replace protocol/API compatibility certification where both required.
159. Sandbox Certification
Confirms runtime restrictions under representative policy.
160. Hard Rule
Sandbox pass does not prove production network availability/performance.
161. Privacy Certification
Can include:
anonymous-mode support
telemetry constraints
deletion behavior
external sink disclosure
162. Hard Rule
Privacy certification limited to observed/tested scope.
163. Security Certification
Can include:
sandbox containment
secret handling
revocation
dependency integrity
164. Hard Rule
Security certification does not mean “invulnerable”.
165. Qualification Expiry
Certification may not need arbitrary calendar expiry if evidence remains valid, but policy can require periodic revalidation.
166. Hard Rule
Evidence invalidation matters more than cosmetic date alone.
167. Periodic Revalidation
Useful for:
dependency advisories
host compatibility
runtime policy changes
168. Hard Rule
Periodic scan does not require user-level install telemetry.
169. Installed Extension Reassessment
Device can locally compare certification/revocation metadata.
170. Hard Rule
No need to report individual install identity centrally.
171. Local Certification Cache
Signed/freshness-aware.
172. Hard Rule
Stale cache cannot permissively approve high-risk new install.
173. Offline Certification Bundle
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionOfflineCertificationBundle { pub certification: ExtensionCertificationRecord, pub qualification_digest: Digest, pub evidence_manifest_digest: Digest, pub revocation_snapshot: Digest, } }
174. Hard Rule
Offline install checks current-enough revocation policy.
175. Fault-Injection Evidence
Records exact injected fault and invariant outcome.
176. Hard Rule
Chaos result without scenario definition is not evidence.
177. Formal Verification Evidence
Can reference:
Kani proof
TLA+ model result
Loom concurrency test
178. Hard Rule
Formal proof scope must be explicit.
179. Kani Use
Suitable for:
permission attenuation
revocation dominance
queue bounds
state-machine invariants
180. TLA+ Use
Suitable for:
update lifecycle
certification lifecycle
state sync
job retry
181. Loom Use
Suitable for:
revocation races
IPC shutdown
update activation
concurrent state merge
182. Hard Rule
Formal methods supplement real implementation testing.
183. Security Regression Corpus
Keep minimized non-sensitive cases.
184. Hard Rule
No real user payloads in regression corpus by default.
185. Privacy Regression Corpus
Synthetic fixtures for:
lock-screen redaction
anonymous-mode metadata
deletion
external sink denial
186. Hard Rule
Privacy test fixtures remain synthetic.
187. Mutation Testing
Optional but useful for critical authorization logic.
188. Hard Rule
Mutation score is not a global quality score.
189. Coverage Dimensions
Track separately:
requirement coverage
branch coverage
mutation coverage
state-space coverage
platform/environment coverage
190. Hard Rule
No single coverage percentage as release verdict.
191. Compatibility Coverage
Matrix completeness matters.
192. Hard Rule
Untested matrix cell remains Unknown.
193. Release Confidence
Multidimensional.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionReleaseConfidence { pub functional: ReadinessState, pub security: ReadinessState, pub privacy: ReadinessState, pub compatibility: ReadinessState, pub reliability: ReadinessState, pub performance: ReadinessState, } }
194. Hard Rule
No global confidence score.
195. Unknown
Never converted to Ready automatically.
196. Certification Gate
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ExtensionCertificationService { fn evaluate( &self, package: ExtensionQualificationPackage, ) -> Result<ExtensionQualificationDecision, ExtensionCertificationError>; } }
197. Evidence Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ExtensionEvidenceService { fn record( &self, evidence: ExtensionVerificationEvidence, ) -> Result<ExtensionEvidenceId, ExtensionCertificationError>; fn freshness( &self, evidence: ExtensionEvidenceId, ) -> Result<EvidenceFreshness, ExtensionCertificationError>; } }
198. Compatibility Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ExtensionCompatibilityQualificationService { fn matrix( &self, extension: ExtensionId, version: ExtensionVersion, ) -> Result<ExtensionCompatibilityMatrix, ExtensionCertificationError>; } }
199. Fault Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ExtensionFaultInjectionService { async fn run( &self, scenario: ExtensionFaultScenario, ) -> Result<ExtensionFaultEvidence, ExtensionCertificationError>; } }
200. Release Gate Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ExtensionReleaseEvidenceGate { fn authorize_promotion( &self, package: ExtensionPackageId, ) -> Result<ReleaseGateDecision, ExtensionCertificationError>; } }
201. Error Taxonomy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionCertificationError { QualificationUnknown, EvidenceMissing, EvidenceStale, EvidenceInvalidated, MandatoryVerificationFailed, CompatibilityUnknown, CertificationSuspended, CertificationRevoked, ArtifactMismatch, EnvironmentMismatch, HardRequirementWaiverAttempt, Unauthorized, Internal, } }
202. Observability
Safe metrics:
qualification duration
test failure class
compatibility unknown count
evidence invalidation count
certification suspension count
203. Forbidden:
developer ranking
individual productivity
user behavior
private extension data
204. Hard Rule
Assurance telemetry is process/system health, not people analytics.
205. Qualification SLOs
Examples:
critical revocation reflected within target
evidence invalidation propagates within target
compatibility matrix updates within target
qualification artifact mismatch detected immediately
206. Security SLO
0 unqualified exact artifact promoted
0 revoked certification accepted
0 hard security/privacy verification waived
207. Privacy SLO
0 production user data in extension qualification
0 individual user install history required for certification
0 privacy review based on hidden behavioral surveillance
208. Failure Modes
stale evidence
environment mismatch
artifact rebuild drift
false compatibility assumption
flaky mandatory test
209. Stale Evidence
Invalidate and re-run affected obligations.
210. Environment Mismatch
Evidence cannot satisfy target matrix cell.
211. Artifact Drift
Exact digest mismatch blocks promotion.
212. Compatibility Assumption
Untested cell remains Unknown.
213. Flaky Mandatory Test
Quarantine; cannot silently pass qualification.
214. Testing The Test System
Meta-tests required.
215. Meta-Test Scenarios
evidence tamper
runner identity mismatch
stale certification cache
wrong artifact digest
waiver on hard requirement
216. Hard Rule
Assurance infrastructure is itself security-critical.
217. Fuzzing
Fuzz:
evidence manifests
compatibility matrices
qualification packages
certification records
fault scenario definitions
218. Property Tests
Properties:
artifact digest mismatch can never pass release gate
revoked certification can never become valid through stale cache
Unknown compatibility can never satisfy Supported requirement
hard verification obligation can never be waived into Qualified
219. Formal Verification Targets
Strong candidates:
qualification lifecycle
certification suspension/revocation
release evidence gate
evidence freshness propagation
220. Kani Candidate
artifact/evidence/gate invariants.
221. TLA+ Candidate
plan → execute → evidence → qualify → certify → suspend/revoke
222. Loom Candidate
Concurrent:
evidence invalidation
release promotion
certification suspension
cache refresh
223. Performance
Qualification is not runtime hot path.
224. Hard Rule
No certification lookup on every ordinary extension host call.
225. Runtime Cache
Runtime can cache verified install/certification state with signed epoch/freshness rules.
226. Hard Rule
Revocation invalidates cache promptly.
227. Parallel Testing
Qualification methods can run in parallel where independent.
228. Hard Rule
Parallelism bounded by resource policy.
229. Test Sharding
Allowed.
230. Hard Rule
Shard evidence remains attributable to exact artifact/environment.
231. Storage
Separate:
qualification plans
test descriptors
evidence metadata
compatibility matrices
certification records
revocation/suspension state
232. Evidence Blobs
Content-addressed object store.
233. Hard Rule
Evidence package immutable; corrections via supersession.
234. Secrets
Never stored in test evidence unless deliberately encrypted/redacted and absolutely required.
235. Hard Rule
Default evidence contains no production secrets/user content.
236. Partitioning
By:
extension
version
package digest
platform
qualification
No user/person analytics partition.
237. Crate Layout
Recommended:
crates/
├── siar-extension-assurance-core/
├── siar-extension-verification-matrix/
├── siar-extension-test-registry/
├── siar-extension-sandbox-qualification/
├── siar-extension-compat-matrix/
├── siar-extension-fault-injection/
├── siar-extension-certification/
├── siar-extension-release-evidence/
├── siar-extension-assurance-observability/
└── siar-extension-assurance-testkit/
238. siar-extension-assurance-core
Owns:
ExtensionQualificationId
ExtensionAssuranceClass
ExtensionQualificationState
ExtensionCertificationError
239. siar-extension-verification-matrix
Policy mapping assurance class→required verification methods.
240. siar-extension-test-registry
Stable test IDs, intent, method, domain, environment.
241. siar-extension-sandbox-qualification
Synthetic sandbox scenarios and isolation validation.
242. siar-extension-compat-matrix
Host/SDK/platform/privacy-mode compatibility evidence.
243. siar-extension-fault-injection
Crash/network/storage/permission/queue fault scenarios.
244. siar-extension-certification
Qualification decisions, attestations, suspension/revocation.
245. siar-extension-release-evidence
Exact-artifact release evidence package and promotion gate.
246. siar-extension-assurance-observability
Aggregate qualification/certification health only.
247. siar-extension-assurance-testkit
Meta-tests, gate tests, stale-evidence/revocation/privacy tests.
248. Security, Privacy & Correctness Invariants
Mandatory:
1. Extension test execution, verification evidence, qualification, certification, marketplace publication, release promotion, installation, and runtime activation are distinct states and no downstream trust state may be inferred solely from an upstream “passed” flag.
2. Every qualification and certification record binds an exact extension package digest, dependency lockfile, SBOM, provenance, capability/data-flow scope, compatibility baseline, and test environment; rebuilding or materially changing any of these invalidates affected evidence.
3. Mandatory security/privacy/authorization/revocation/sandbox requirements cannot be waived into Qualified or Certified state; Unknown, Inconclusive, Skipped, stale, mismatched, or quarantined flaky evidence never counts as Passed.
4. Compatibility is matrix-scoped across host/SDK/protocol/platform/architecture/privacy-mode/peer-version dimensions; an untested cell remains Unknown and cannot be represented as Supported.
5. Sandbox qualification uses synthetic/controlled data and validates negative boundaries—denied permissions, broker isolation, revocation, resource limits, data-flow denial—not merely successful happy-path behavior.
6. Fault injection, fuzzing, property testing, adversarial validation, migration tests, and crash/recovery tests are bounded, reproducible where possible, and cannot target production user data or production fault domains by default.
7. Security/privacy certification is evidence- and scope-specific and does not mean an extension is universally “safe”; certification states can be suspended/revoked when vulnerabilities, evidence invalidation, compatibility breaks, or privacy/security incidents emerge.
8. Release promotion is exact-artifact based: the artifact qualified/certified is the artifact distributed; rebuilding after certification creates a new artifact identity requiring evidence reconciliation or requalification.
9. Evidence freshness is dependency-aware and traceable; package, lockfile, host policy, capability, data-flow, migration, environment, or vulnerability changes invalidate only what they materially affect, but stale evidence can never silently satisfy current mandatory gates.
10. Assurance telemetry, test artifacts, compatibility matrices, certification records, and evidence archives are technical and privacy-minimized; they cannot become user-install surveillance, developer productivity scoring, workforce analytics, or repositories of production private content.
11. Offline/air-gapped certification relies on signed qualification/certification/revocation bundles with explicit freshness; stale cache or offline state can never permissively authorize a high-risk new package when current trust state is unknown.
12. Extension assurance integrates with marketplace distribution, SDK/compatibility registry, runtime sandboxing, permissions, data governance, IPC, background jobs, UI/accessibility, state sync, dependencies, update orchestration, supply-chain security, vulnerability management, release evidence archive, and audit without creating a side channel around SIAR's security, privacy, anonymity, local-first, or tenant-isolation guarantees.
249. Initial Production Scope
Implement first:
typed qualification/certification lifecycle
extension assurance classes
verification matrix
stable test registry
sandbox qualification environment
deterministic fixtures
compatibility matrix
negative capability/data-flow tests
security/privacy qualification
resource-isolation tests
fault injection
migration/update/rollback tests
flaky test governance
evidence freshness/invalidation
signed CI evidence
exact artifact/package binding
certification attestations
suspension/revocation
release evidence package
promotion gate
offline certification bundle
privacy-safe assurance metrics
extension-assurance testkit
Then add:
formal verification automation
advanced adversarial campaigns
mutation testing for critical authorization
cross-platform hardware qualification farms
portable certification transparency proofs
continuous compatibility revalidation
formal evidence-gate proofs
250. Definition of Done
Part 144 is complete when:
- extension qualification binds exact artifacts/dependencies;
- assurance classes drive required methods;
- compatibility is matrix-based;
- Unknown never equals Supported/Passed;
- sandbox tests include negative boundaries;
- fault injection and fuzzing are first-class;
- security/privacy/update/data-lifecycle tests are explicit;
- flaky mandatory tests cannot satisfy qualification;
- evidence freshness/invalidation is enforced;
- certification can suspend/revoke;
- release promotion verifies exact artifact;
- offline certification has signed freshness/revocation state;
- assurance metrics do not become user/developer surveillance;
- assurance/gate/privacy/fuzz/formal meta-tests are specified.
251. Final Architecture
EXTENSION PACKAGE
│
▼
QUALIFICATION PLAN
│
┌───────────────┼────────────────┐
│ │ │
TEST SUITE SANDBOX COMPAT MATRIX
│ │ │
└───────────────┼────────────────┘
▼
VERIFIED EVIDENCE
│
▼
QUALIFICATION
│
▼
CERTIFICATION
│
▼
RELEASE EVIDENCE GATE
Extension-assurance safety model:
exact artifact binding
+
verification matrix
+
synthetic sandbox
+
negative testing
+
compatibility matrix
+
fault injection
+
fresh evidence
+
revocable certification
+
exact-artifact promotion
not:
run a few happy-path tests, mark the extension “safe”, rebuild it later, and ship because CI was green once
252. Final Principle
Extension assurance is trustworthy when SIAR can answer what was tested, on which exact artifact, under which environment and policy, what failed or remained unknown, and whether that evidence is still valid today.
The correct model is:
bind evidence to exact code
+
test both allowed and denied behavior
+
qualify across explicit compatibility cells
+
inject failures
+
verify migration and revocation
+
treat stale/unknown as non-passing
+
certify with scoped authorities
+
promote the exact artifact
+
revoke trust when evidence no longer holds
This architecture gives SIAR a privacy-preserving extension assurance foundation for testing, sandbox validation, compatibility matrices, fault injection, security/privacy qualification, certification, release evidence, freshness, and revocation while preserving the anonymity, local-first, least-authority, marketplace, runtime, permission, data-governance, dependency, update, and anti-surveillance guarantees established across Parts 34–143.