Core System Architecture Part 46 — Anonymous Reputation, Trust Signals, Abuse Reporting & Privacy-Preserving Moderation Architecture
SIAR — Secure, Local-First, Multi-Transport Communication Platform
Series: Core System Architecture
Part: 46
Status: Architecture specification
Primary language: Rust
Builds on: Core System Architecture Parts 34–45
Primary purpose: define the complete privacy-preserving accountability architecture for SIAR, including scoped reputation, trust signals, abuse reporting, evidence packaging, moderation capabilities, sanctions, false-report resistance, Sybil-aware reputation, appeals, transparency, and Rust service boundaries.
1. Purpose
Privacy systems face a tension:
strong anonymity
vs
accountability
A system that exposes identity everywhere weakens privacy.
A system with no accountability at all may become vulnerable to:
spam
harassment
fraud
malware
coordinated abuse
resource exhaustion
The governing principle is:
SIAR should support abuse resistance and moderation through scoped capabilities, local trust, pseudonymous evidence, and privacy-preserving sanctions rather than requiring a globally linkable identity.
2. Architectural Position
Messages / Calls / Groups / Discovery
│
▼
Local Trust / Reputation
│
▼
Abuse Reporting
│
▼
Moderation Capability
│
▼
Scoped Sanction / Revocation
3. Core Separation
Keep separate:
Identity Trust
Behavior Reputation
Relationship Trust
Moderation Authority
Global Identity
4. Non-Goals
Part 46 does not require:
public social credit
global user score
real-name identity
centralized behavior profiling
public blacklist of users
5. Trust Types
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum TrustSignalType { IdentityVerified, DeviceVerified, KnownContact, GroupMember, SuccessfulHistory, ModeratorVerified, } }
6. Identity Trust
Answers:
is this the same identity I verified?
7. Behavioral Trust
Answers:
has this pseudonymous participant behaved acceptably in this scope?
8. Relationship Trust
Local user decision.
9. Reputation Scope
Reputation MUST be scoped.
Possible scopes:
relationship
group
community
service
operator
10. Reputation Scope Type
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ReputationScope { Relationship(RelationshipId), Group(GroupId), Community(CommunityId), Service(ServiceId), } }
11. No Global User Reputation by Default
Hard rule.
12. Why
Global reputation creates:
cross-context tracking
behavioral profiling
identity correlation
social graph reconstruction
13. Pseudonymous Reputation
Use scope-local subject IDs.
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ReputationSubjectId(pub [u8; 32]); }
14. Subject Rotation
Can rotate on:
epoch
community migration
privacy policy
15. Rotation Tradeoff
Too frequent:
destroys accountability
Too stable:
increases linkability
16. Initial Recommendation
Per-community or per-group stable pseudonym.
17. Trust Signal
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct TrustSignal { pub signal_type: TrustSignalType, pub scope: ReputationScope, pub subject: ReputationSubjectId, pub issued_at: Timestamp, pub expires_at: Option<Timestamp>, pub issuer: TrustIssuer, } }
18. Trust Issuer
Could be:
local user
group authority
service authority
verified contact
19. Local Trust First
Prefer:
local trust graph
over server-owned global score.
20. Reputation Model
Avoid opaque single-number score.
21. Better Model
Structured dimensions:
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ReputationSummary { pub reliability: ReputationLevel, pub abuse_history: AbuseRiskLevel, pub verification: VerificationLevel, pub account_age_bucket: Option<AccountAgeBucket>, } }
22. Reputation Level
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ReputationLevel { Unknown, Limited, Established, Trusted, } }
23. Abuse Risk Level
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum AbuseRiskLevel { Unknown, Low, Elevated, Restricted, } }
24. No Absolute Score
Hard rule.
25. Evidence-Based Signals
Trust signals should correspond to evidence.
Examples:
identity verified in person
member has existed for 90+ days
no valid abuse sanctions
moderator attestation
26. Privacy Boundary
Do not publish raw evidence globally.
27. Abuse Categories
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum AbuseCategory { Spam, Harassment, Threat, Fraud, Malware, Impersonation, UnauthorizedContent, ResourceAbuse, ModerationEvasion, } }
28. Report Scope
A report should be tied to:
specific event
specific pseudonym
specific group/community
not necessarily global account identity.
29. Abuse Report
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct AbuseReport { pub report_id: AbuseReportId, pub scope: ReputationScope, pub subject: ReputationSubjectId, pub category: AbuseCategory, pub evidence: AbuseEvidenceBundle, pub reporter: ReporterPrivacyDescriptor, pub created_at: Timestamp, } }
30. Report ID
Random.
31. Reporter Privacy
Possible:
identified to moderator
pseudonymous
anonymous
32. Reporter Privacy Type
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ReporterPrivacyMode { Identified, Pseudonymous, Anonymous, } }
33. Anonymous Reporting
Useful for sensitive communities.
34. Risk
Anonymous reports can be abused.
35. Therefore
Need:
rate limits
proof of membership
evidence requirements
duplicate suppression
36. Abuse Evidence
Potential:
message
attachment digest
call event
group control event
metadata necessary for verification
37. Evidence Minimization
Only include what is needed.
38. Evidence Bundle
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct AbuseEvidenceBundle { pub version: EvidenceVersion, pub event_proofs: Vec<EventEvidence>, pub context_digest: Option<[u8; 32]>, pub reporter_statement: Option<EncryptedText>, } }
39. Event Evidence
Could contain:
signed message envelope
sender pseudonym
epoch
timestamp bucket
40. Avoid Full Conversation Export
Hard rule unless reporter explicitly chooses.
41. Message Evidence Authenticity
Use existing message authentication.
42. Attachment Evidence
Prefer:
content digest
manifest proof
plus optional file upload if required.
43. Sensitive Evidence
Encrypted to moderation authority.
44. Evidence Storage
Separate secure store.
45. Evidence Retention
Short and policy-defined.
46. Evidence Access
Role-based and audited.
47. Moderator Capability
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ModeratorCapability(SecretBytes); }
48. Capability Scope
Bound to:
community/group
actions
expiry
49. Moderator Actions
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ModerationAction { Warn, RateLimit, Mute, RemoveContent, SuspendPosting, RemoveMember, RevokeCapability, } }
50. Moderation Does Not Require Real Identity
Hard rule.
51. Scope-Limited Sanction
A group moderator can sanction:
that group pseudonym
without learning global account identity.
52. Global Safety Authority
If SIAR ever supports cross-service sanctions, it must be a separate explicit subsystem.
53. Default
No global cross-context moderation identity.
54. Sanction Object
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ModerationSanction { pub sanction_id: SanctionId, pub scope: ReputationScope, pub subject: ReputationSubjectId, pub action: ModerationAction, pub starts_at: Timestamp, pub expires_at: Option<Timestamp>, pub authority_proof: ModerationAuthorityProof, } }
55. Sanction Enforcement
Possible:
deny post capability
deny call capability
deny group join
rate-limit requests
56. Capability Revocation
Preferred enforcement primitive.
57. Why
Works without:
global identity blacklist
58. Temporary Sanction
Can expire automatically.
59. Permanent Group Removal
Revoke membership capability and rekey group.
60. Moderation Privacy
Ordinary members need not know moderator identity.
61. Moderator Accountability
Administrative audit can still know which authority capability performed action.
62. Anonymous Moderator Action
Public event may say:
Authorized moderator action
63. Moderation Audit Record
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ModerationAuditRecord { pub action_id: ModerationActionId, pub scope: ReputationScope, pub authority: ModerationAuthorityId, pub action: ModerationAction, pub timestamp: Timestamp, } }
64. Audit Privacy
No reporter identity unless required.
65. False Reporting
Threat:
coordinated malicious reports
66. Defenses
rate limits
reporter reputation
evidence authenticity
duplicate detection
moderator review
67. Reporter Reputation
Scoped.
68. No Retaliatory Public Score
Hard rule.
69. Duplicate Reports
Can be aggregated.
70. Report Fingerprint
Use privacy-safe digest.
71. Coordinated Abuse Detection
May aggregate:
same evidence
same subject
same scope
without cross-scope identity linking.
72. Sybil Reporting Attack
Attacker creates many pseudonyms and reports same target.
73. Mitigations
membership age
capability age
resource cost
rate limits
proof of participation
74. Proof of Participation
Reporter proves:
was valid member during event
without revealing global identity.
75. Anonymous Credential
Future option.
76. Initial Production
Use:
scope-local membership capability proof
77. Trust Aggregation
Avoid naive:
100 reports = guilty
78. Better
Weight by:
evidence quality
independent reporters
scope history
moderator verification
79. Independence
Reports from same operator/device cluster should not count as fully independent where detectable.
80. Privacy Constraint
Sybil detection must not become universal device tracking.
81. Device Fingerprint
Avoid persistent fingerprint.
82. Safer Sybil Inputs
membership age
capability issuance history
rate-limit token
scope-local credential
83. Trust Attestation
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct TrustAttestation { pub scope: ReputationScope, pub subject: ReputationSubjectId, pub claim: TrustClaim, pub issuer: TrustIssuer, pub expires_at: Option<Timestamp>, } }
84. Trust Claim
Examples:
VerifiedMember
LongStandingMember
ModeratorApproved
85. Public Trust Badges
Can leak social structure.
86. Recommendation
Expose only minimal user-facing trust indicators.
87. User-Facing Trust
Examples:
Verified
Known contact
New member
Restricted
88. No "87/100 Trust Score"
Hard rule.
89. Local Reputation Cache
Store:
scope-local trust
sanctions
report outcomes
90. Server Reputation State
If server-assisted:
opaque scoped records
not global graph.
91. Community Reputation Authority
Could maintain:
community-local pseudonym state
92. Federation
Different communities may have independent moderation policy.
93. Cross-Community Import
Default:
no automatic reputation import
94. Optional Portable Attestations
User may carry signed claims.
95. Portable Attestation Risk
Cross-context linkability.
96. Strict Mode
Disable portable reputation by default.
97. Reputation Decay
Old behavior should not define user forever.
98. Expiry
Positive and negative signals can expire.
99. Severe Sanctions
May persist longer.
100. Policy-Driven
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ReputationRetentionPolicy { pub positive_ttl: Duration, pub warning_ttl: Duration, pub severe_ttl: Duration, } }
101. Appeal
Moderated systems need appeal.
102. Appeal Privacy
Appeal can use:
scope-local pseudonym
sanction ID
without global identity.
103. Appeal Object
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ModerationAppeal { pub appeal_id: AppealId, pub sanction_id: SanctionId, pub subject: ReputationSubjectId, pub statement: EncryptedText, } }
104. Appeal Authority
May differ from original moderator.
105. Two-Level Review
Useful for serious sanctions.
106. Emergency Actions
Immediate suspension may happen before full review.
107. Audit Requirement
Emergency action must be reviewed later.
108. Transparency
Community may publish aggregate moderation statistics.
109. Safe Aggregate Stats
reports received
reports upheld
sanctions issued
appeals overturned
110. Differential Privacy
Potential for public aggregate metrics.
111. No Small-Group Stats
Avoid deanonymization.
112. Moderation Transparency Log
Append-only local/community log.
113. Public vs Private Entries
Public:
policy version
aggregate action
Private:
evidence
reporter
subject mapping
114. Policy Version
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ModerationPolicyVersion(pub u64); }
115. Moderation Policy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ModerationPolicy { pub version: ModerationPolicyVersion, pub report_rules: ReportRules, pub sanction_rules: SanctionRules, pub appeal_rules: AppealRules, } }
116. Signed Policy
Group/community participants can verify policy version.
117. Policy Changes
Should not silently change retroactively.
118. Retroactive Enforcement
Only for severe safety cases if explicitly defined.
119. Abuse Rate Limits
Unknown users:
strict limits
Trusted scoped users:
higher limits
120. Rate-Limit Credential
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ScopedRateLimitCredential(SecretBytes); }
121. Privacy-Preserving Rate Limits
Goal:
limit actions
without global identity
122. Token Bucket
Scoped by pseudonymous credential.
123. Anonymous E-Cash-Style Tokens
Future option for unlinkable rate limits.
124. Initial Scope
Use pseudonymous scoped tokens.
125. Resource Abuse
Examples:
large uploads
call floods
group spam
bridge abuse
126. Resource Policy
Trust level may affect:
upload quota
request quota
call invitation rate
127. Do Not Reduce E2EE Security
Rate limiting operates outside content encryption.
128. Malware Reports
Can include:
file digest
manifest digest
129. Known-Bad Digest Lists
Potential.
130. Privacy Risk
File hash lookup can reveal what users possess.
131. Recommendation
Use local known-bad checks where possible.
132. Remote Reputation Lookup
If used, query privacy-preservingly.
133. No Raw Attachment Hash Telemetry
Hard rule.
134. Contact-Level Trust
User can locally mark:
trusted
untrusted
blocked
135. Local Trust Does Not Propagate Automatically
Hard rule.
136. Trusted Introductions
Can produce signed attestation.
137. No Web-of-Trust Auto-Expansion
Avoid:
friend of friend is trusted
138. Group Moderation Integration
Part 43 capabilities:
post
read
moderate
can be revoked.
139. Anonymous Group Ban
Revoke:
membership capability
post capability
future epoch keys
140. Group Report
Reporter may remain pseudonymous to moderators if policy allows.
141. Group Message Proof
Report includes signed/authenticated message envelope.
142. Private Calls Abuse
Call spam can be reported by:
invite proof
call capability
session metadata
143. Do Not Upload Media by Default
Call report does not include audio/video unless user explicitly supplies evidence.
144. Discovery Abuse
Report:
spam contact request
impersonation
enumeration behavior
145. Presence Abuse
Presence is capability-gated, so abuse mostly means capability misuse.
146. Bridge/Mix Abuse
Infrastructure moderation is separate operator governance.
147. Reputation Across Infrastructure
Node/operator reputation from Part 39 is distinct from user/community reputation.
148. Hard Separation
Do not mix:
user behavior reputation
mix-node operator reputation
149. User Safety Preferences
Local filters can act before moderation.
150. Examples
block unknown callers
hide unknown attachments
mute new group members
151. Local Filtering
Privacy-preserving because no server decision needed.
152. Content Classification
If optional on-device AI is used:
local only by default
153. External Moderation AI
Requires explicit consent and privacy review.
154. Maximum Anonymity
No external content moderation API by default.
155. Report Submission Path
Use anonymous transport where possible.
156. Moderator Endpoint
Report can be delivered via:
anonymous mailbox
mixnet
community moderation mailbox
157. Reporter IP Hiding
Strict mode requires anonymous report submission.
158. Evidence Confidentiality
Encrypt to moderation authority.
159. Evidence Integrity
Signed/authenticated.
160. Evidence Chain
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct EvidenceChain { pub items: Vec<EvidenceItem>, pub root_digest: [u8; 32], } }
161. Evidence Mutation
Detected.
162. Moderator View
Shows:
report category
evidence
scope
subject pseudonym
policy
163. Moderator Must Not See Unnecessary Global Identity
Hard rule.
164. Escalation
Some cases may require explicit identity/legal escalation outside ordinary anonymous moderation.
165. Separate Boundary
Must be policy- and jurisdiction-specific.
166. No Automatic Deanonymization
Hard rule.
167. Identity Reveal Capability
Do not build universal deanonymization key into SIAR.
168. Why
Such a key becomes:
single catastrophic privacy backdoor
169. Safe Architecture
Moderation enforces capability-level sanctions without identity reveal.
170. Appeals and Due Process
For community moderation:
notice
reason
duration
appeal path
where appropriate.
171. Anonymous Notice
Can be delivered via relationship/group mailbox.
172. Sanction Reason
Use structured category.
173. Avoid Excess Evidence Exposure
Do not show reporter identity.
174. Moderator Misuse
Threat:
malicious moderator
175. Mitigations
capability scope
audit log
threshold approval
appeals
policy transparency
176. Threshold Moderation
For severe actions:
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ModerationQuorum { pub required: u16, pub total: u16, } }
177. Actions Requiring Quorum
Potential:
permanent ban
mass deletion
owner removal
178. Ordinary Actions
Single moderator may handle:
warning
temporary mute
179. Key Separation
Moderator signing keys separate from:
user identity keys
group content keys
180. Moderator Key Rotation
Supported.
181. Compromised Moderator
Revoke capability.
182. Moderation State Machine
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ReportState { Submitted, Triaged, Investigating, Resolved, Rejected, Appealed, Closed, } }
183. Sanction State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum SanctionState { Proposed, Active, Expired, Revoked, Overturned, } }
184. Transactionality
When sanction activates:
persist sanction
revoke capabilities
record audit
atomically/transactionally coordinated.
185. Crash Safety
No active sanction without corresponding durable record.
186. Idempotency
Repeated moderation action must not duplicate side effects.
187. Report Dedup
Same report resubmission safe.
188. Moderation Store
Potential tables:
reputation_subjects
trust_attestations
abuse_reports
evidence_items
moderation_sanctions
moderation_appeals
moderation_audit
rate_limit_credentials
189. Secret References
Store capabilities by secure-store ref.
190. Data Retention
Moderation evidence has explicit TTL.
191. Legal Hold
If product supports it, separate explicit governance feature.
192. Default
No indefinite retention.
193. Deletion
Resolved benign report can be deleted earlier.
194. Negative Reputation Retention
Policy-defined.
195. Reputation Reset
Subject may obtain fresh pseudonym after leaving/rejoining depending policy.
196. Evasion Risk
Complete reset enables ban evasion.
197. Privacy vs Evasion
Needs scope-specific balance.
198. Rejoin Policy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum RejoinPolicy { AllowedFresh, Cooldown, ModeratorApproval, Denied, } }
199. Ban-Evasion Token
Could maintain scope-local revoked credential digest.
200. No Global Device Ban by Default
Hard rule.
201. High-Risk Communities
May require stronger admission credentials.
202. Credential Types
Potential:
invite
verified membership
organization credential
resource bond
203. Community Rules
Signed and versioned.
204. Rule Acknowledgement
User may accept before joining.
205. Rule Version
Stored locally.
206. Rule Change Notification
Privacy-safe.
207. Reputation Service Trait
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ScopedReputationService { fn summary( &self, scope: ReputationScope, subject: ReputationSubjectId, ) -> Result<ReputationSummary, ReputationError>; fn add_attestation( &self, attestation: TrustAttestation, ) -> Result<(), ReputationError>; } }
208. Reporting Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { #[async_trait] pub trait AbuseReportingService: Send + Sync { async fn submit( &self, report: AbuseReport, ) -> Result<AbuseReportReceipt, ReportError>; async fn status( &self, report_id: AbuseReportId, ) -> Result<ReportState, ReportError>; } }
209. Moderation Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { #[async_trait] pub trait ModerationService: Send + Sync { async fn review( &self, report_id: AbuseReportId, ) -> Result<ModerationCase, ModerationError>; async fn apply( &self, sanction: ModerationSanction, ) -> Result<(), ModerationError>; async fn appeal( &self, appeal: ModerationAppeal, ) -> Result<(), ModerationError>; } }
210. Capability Revocation Service
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub trait ScopedCapabilityRevoker { fn revoke_subject( &self, scope: ReputationScope, subject: ReputationSubjectId, ) -> Result<(), CapabilityError>; } }
211. Observability
Privacy-safe metrics:
reports submitted
reports upheld
sanctions active
appeals
abuse category buckets
212. Forbidden Metrics
No:
AccountId
DeviceId
RelationshipId
message plaintext
reporter identity
213. Moderator Metrics
Aggregate by:
community
policy version
only where safe.
214. Small Community Privacy
Avoid publishing public stats if low counts.
215. Support Bundle
Redact:
report IDs if linkable
evidence
subject pseudonyms
moderator IDs
216. UI — Trust Signals
Display simple:
Verified contact
New member
Established member
Restricted
217. UI — Report
Flow:
choose category
select evidence
review privacy impact
submit
218. Evidence Preview
User sees what will be shared.
219. Reporter Privacy Choice
If policy allows:
identified
pseudonymous
anonymous
220. UI — Moderation
Moderator sees only necessary context.
221. UI — Sanction
Show:
action
duration
reason
policy reference
222. UI — Appeal
Structured appeal.
223. No Public Reputation Leaderboard
Hard rule.
224. No Shame Badges
Avoid permanent public negative labels.
225. Privacy Lab Integration
Part 42 should test whether moderation data can be used to correlate identities across scopes.
226. Cross-Scope Correlation Test
Same user in two communities should not be linkable via:
subject ID
sanction ID
report metadata
227. Reporter Anonymity Test
Moderator cannot identify anonymous reporter from payload.
228. False Report Test
Many low-trust reports do not automatically trigger severe sanction.
229. Sybil Report Test
Thousands of fresh pseudonyms report one target.
230. Evidence Forgery Test
Tampered evidence rejected.
231. Capability Revocation Test
Banned subject cannot post after sanction.
232. Appeal Test
Overturned sanction restores allowed capabilities with fresh secrets if needed.
233. Moderator Abuse Test
Unauthorized moderator action rejected.
234. Threshold Test
Permanent sanction requires quorum where policy says so.
235. Expiry Test
Temporary sanction expires predictably.
236. Replay Test
Old sanction command cannot be replayed after revocation/epoch change.
237. Fuzzing
Fuzz:
abuse report
evidence bundle
sanction
appeal
trust attestation
238. Property Tests
Properties:
moderator cannot act outside scope
blocked subject cannot retain valid post capability
anonymous report contains no global account identifier
overturned sanction cannot remain active
239. Formal Verification Targets
Good candidates:
report state machine
sanction lifecycle
moderator capability scope
appeal transition
240. TLA+ Candidate
Report + sanction + appeal workflow.
241. Kani Candidate
Capability scope validation.
242. Loom Candidate
Concurrent sanction activation and capability use.
243. Performance Tests
Measure:
report submission
evidence verification
capability revocation
reputation summary lookup
244. Scale Tests
Synthetic communities:
100
10,000
1,000,000
participants for metadata/service scaling, without real identities.
245. Abuse Load Tests
Large coordinated spam/report storms.
246. Privacy-Safe Rate Limiting Tests
Ensure anti-abuse controls do not require global identity.
247. Security Invariants
Mandatory:
1. Reputation is scoped; no universal user score is required.
2. ReputationSubjectId is distinct across unrelated scopes.
3. Moderation does not require revealing global account identity.
4. Reports include minimum evidence necessary.
5. Anonymous reporters are not deanonymized by ordinary moderation flow.
6. Moderator actions are capability-scoped and auditable.
7. Severe sanctions can require quorum.
8. Sanctions enforce through scoped capability revocation.
9. Cross-scope reputation import is opt-in and privacy-reviewed.
10. False-report volume alone cannot automatically trigger severe sanctions.
11. Moderation evidence and capabilities never appear in telemetry/support bundles.
12. SIAR contains no universal deanonymization key for moderation.
248. Recommended Crate Layout
crates/
├── siar-reputation-core/
├── siar-trust-signals/
├── siar-abuse-reporting/
├── siar-moderation-core/
├── siar-moderation-capability/
├── siar-moderation-evidence/
├── siar-moderation-policy/
├── siar-moderation-appeal/
├── siar-reputation-storage/
├── siar-moderation-observability/
└── siar-moderation-testkit/
249. siar-reputation-core
Owns:
scope
subject IDs
reputation levels
errors
250. siar-trust-signals
Structured trust attestations.
251. siar-abuse-reporting
Report submission/status.
252. siar-moderation-core
Cases/sanctions/state machines.
253. siar-moderation-capability
Moderator/action capability enforcement.
254. siar-moderation-evidence
Evidence packaging/verification/storage.
255. siar-moderation-policy
Signed moderation policy.
256. siar-moderation-appeal
Appeal workflows.
257. siar-reputation-storage
Scoped persistence.
258. siar-moderation-observability
Privacy-safe metrics/audit.
259. siar-moderation-testkit
Synthetic abuse, false reports, malicious moderators.
260. Error Taxonomy
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ModerationError { Unauthorized, InvalidEvidence, InvalidScope, ReportRateLimited, SanctionConflict, AppealUnavailable, QuorumInsufficient, CapabilityRevoked, PolicyMismatch, Internal, } }
261. Initial Production Scope
Implement first:
scope-local subject IDs
structured trust signals
group/community-scoped reputation
anonymous/pseudonymous reporting
evidence bundles
moderator capabilities
warning/mute/post suspension/member removal
capability-based sanctions
report rate limits
appeal workflow
audit log
privacy-safe metrics
Then add:
threshold moderation
portable privacy-reviewed attestations
anonymous credential proofs
privacy-preserving rate-limit tokens
differentially private transparency metrics
advanced coordinated-abuse detection
262. Definition of Done
Part 46 is complete when:
- trust and reputation are explicitly scoped
- no global score is required
- scope-local pseudonyms prevent unnecessary cross-context linking
- reports support identified, pseudonymous, and anonymous modes
- evidence is minimized, authenticatable, encrypted, and retention-bounded
- moderation works through scoped capabilities
- sanctions revoke capabilities instead of requiring identity deanonymization
- false-report and Sybil-report resistance are defined
- reporter privacy and moderator accountability coexist
- appeals and audit flows are explicit
- severe sanctions can use quorum
- trust attestations and portable reputation are privacy-reviewed
- cross-scope reputation sharing is opt-in
- observability excludes global identity and evidence content
- fuzz/property/formal/privacy tests are specified
- SIAR contains no universal deanonymization mechanism
263. Final Architecture
TRUST / BEHAVIOR SIGNALS
│
▼
SCOPED REPUTATION STATE
│
┌───────────────┴───────────────┐
│ │
Local Trust Abuse Reports
│
▼
Evidence Review
│
▼
Moderator Capability
│
▼
Scoped Sanction
│
▼
Capability Revocation
Privacy-preserving accountability model:
scope-local pseudonym
+
verifiable evidence
+
capability-based moderation
+
bounded reputation
+
appeals
+
audit
not:
global identity
→ universal score
→ centralized blacklist
264. Final Principle
Privacy and moderation are not mutually exclusive if accountability is designed around scope and capability.
The correct model is:
local/scoped reputation
+
minimal evidence
+
anonymous reporting
+
auditable moderator authority
+
capability revocation
+
appeals
rather than:
identify everyone globally first
then moderate
This architecture gives SIAR a path to meaningful abuse resistance without sacrificing the identity separation, relationship privacy, and anonymity guarantees established in Parts 34–45.