Core System Architecture Part 146 — Anonymous Network Extension Incident Response, Abuse Detection, Quarantine, Emergency Disable, Forensics, Recovery & Privacy-Preserving Extension Security Operations Architecture
SIAR — Secure, Local-First, Multi-Transport Communication Platform
Series: Core System Architecture
Part: 146
Status: Architecture specification
Primary language: Rust
Builds on: Core System Architecture Parts 46, 94–99, 119–126, 133–145
Primary purpose: define SIAR's extension security-operations architecture for incident detection, abuse signals, scoped quarantine, emergency disable, forensic evidence, compromise investigation, blast-radius analysis, containment, recovery, reinstatement, publisher/dependency impact, post-incident improvement, and privacy-preserving defensive operations.
1. Purpose
Third-party extensions create a recurring security-operations problem.
Even after marketplace review, certification, sandboxing, capability controls, update governance, and observability, incidents can still occur:
malicious package
compromised publisher key
sandbox escape attempt
unexpected data exfiltration
supply-chain compromise
permission abuse
resource abuse
crash-loop
privacy violation
The governing principle is:
SIAR must be able to detect, contain, quarantine, investigate, recover, and safely reinstate extension functionality without granting incident responders ambient access to user content or creating a universal emergency backdoor.
2. Architectural Position
EXTENSION SIGNALS
│
▼
INCIDENT DETECTION
│
┌───────────┼───────────┐
│ │ │
ABUSE SECURITY PRIVACY
│ │ │
└───────────┼───────────┘
▼
INCIDENT TRIAGE
│
┌───────────┼───────────┐
│ │ │
CONTAIN QUARANTINE DISABLE
│ │ │
└───────────┼───────────┘
▼
FORENSIC REVIEW
│
▼
RECOVERY / REINSTATE
3. Core Separation
Keep distinct:
incident
alert
abuse signal
quarantine
revocation
emergency disable
forensic evidence
recovery
reinstatement
4. Non-Goals
Part 146 does not create:
global emergency superuser
automatic access to private content
per-user behavioral surveillance
irreversible extension deletion as first response
security operations as general telemetry collection
5. Incident Identity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionIncidentId(pub [u8; 16]); }
6. Incident Class
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionIncidentClass { Security, Privacy, Abuse, Availability, SupplyChain, DataIntegrity, Compatibility, Operational, } }
7. Incident Severity
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionIncidentSeverity { Sev4, Sev3, Sev2, Sev1, } }
8. Hard Rule
Severity is evidence-backed and does not directly imply motive.
9. Incident State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionIncidentState { Detected, Triaging, Containing, Quarantined, Investigating, Recovering, Monitoring, Resolved, Closed, } }
10. No Detected→Closed Direct
Hard rule.
11. Incident Scope
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionIncidentScope { pub extension: ExtensionId, pub package: Option<ExtensionPackageId>, pub version: Option<ExtensionVersion>, pub publisher: Option<PublisherId>, pub tenant: Option<TenantId>, pub platform: Option<PlatformClass>, } }
12. Hard Rule
Scope is explicit and minimized.
13. No User Scope By Default
Hard rule.
14. Incident Trigger
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionIncidentTrigger { SandboxViolation, CapabilityViolation, UnauthorizedDataFlow, RevokedDependency, SignatureAnomaly, CrashSpike, ResourceAbuse, PrivacyLeak, MaliciousBehaviorReport, PublisherCompromise, ManualSecurityReport, } }
15. Hard Rule
Triggers are technical facts or structured reports.
16. Detection Sources
Allowed sources:
runtime policy violations
sandbox violations
revocation feeds
signed advisories
crash/health anomalies
user/admin reports
certification failures
dependency compromise evidence
17. Hard Rule
Do not create incident based only on opaque reputation or popularity.
18. Abuse Signal
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionAbuseSignal { pub extension: ExtensionId, pub class: ExtensionAbuseClass, pub confidence: EvidenceConfidence, pub evidence: Vec<EvidenceRef>, } }
19. Abuse Class
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionAbuseClass { NotificationSpam, PromptAbuse, ResourceAbuse, UnauthorizedEnumeration, PermissionProbing, SuspiciousNetworkUse, RepeatedPolicyViolation, } }
20. Hard Rule
Abuse detection must rely on technical behavior, not private user content.
21. Evidence Confidence
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum EvidenceConfidence { Confirmed, Strong, Moderate, Weak, Unknown, } }
22. Hard Rule
Weak/Unknown evidence cannot justify maximum containment without corroboration except where hard fail-safe policy says otherwise.
23. Incident Decision
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionIncidentDecision { Observe, Throttle, RestrictCapability, QuarantineRuntime, BlockNewInstalls, EmergencyDisable, RevokePackage, } }
24. Hard Rule
Response is scoped to evidence and blast radius.
25. Containment First
Prefer the narrowest action that reliably stops harm.
26. Example
If only notification abuse is confirmed:
revoke notification capability
not:
delete all extension data
27. Hard Rule
Containment does not destroy user data by default.
28. Quarantine State
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionQuarantineState { None, RuntimeOnly, CapabilityRestricted, BackgroundDisabled, NetworkDisabled, FullExecutionBlocked, } }
29. Hard Rule
Quarantine state is explicit and revocable.
30. Runtime Quarantine
Stops code execution while preserving data.
31. Hard Rule
Quarantined extension runtime cannot make broker calls.
32. Capability Restriction
Can remove selected capabilities.
33. Hard Rule
Restricted capabilities propagate via grant epoch immediately.
34. Network Disable
Blocks external/network sinks.
35. Hard Rule
Network disable does not imply local data deletion.
36. Background Disable
Cancels queued jobs.
37. Hard Rule
No orphan background execution after quarantine.
38. Full Execution Block
Extension code does not run.
39. Platform-Controlled Recovery UI
Still available.
40. Hard Rule
Revoked/quarantined extension cannot render its own trusted recovery screen.
41. Emergency Disable
Reserved for confirmed or sufficiently severe risk.
42. Emergency Disable Authority
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionEmergencyAuthority { PlatformSecurity, MarketplaceSecurity, TenantSecurity, } }
43. Hard Rule
Authority scope limited to owned domain.
44. No Universal Superuser
Hard rule.
45. Emergency Action
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionEmergencyAction { pub incident: ExtensionIncidentId, pub authority: ExtensionEmergencyAuthority, pub action: ExtensionIncidentDecision, pub scope: ExtensionIncidentScope, pub expires_at: Option<Timestamp>, } }
46. Hard Rule
Emergency actions are signed, attributable, scoped, and auditable.
47. Dual Control
Required for platform-wide high-impact disable where feasible.
48. Hard Rule
No single online operator can silently disable arbitrary unrelated extensions at global scope.
49. Emergency Disable Propagation
Through signed revocation/incident policy.
50. Hard Rule
Anti-rollback epoch.
51. Emergency Policy Epoch
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionEmergencyPolicyEpoch(pub u64); }
52. Hard Rule
Older permissive policy cannot override newer disable.
53. Offline Enforcement
Cached signed emergency policy applies locally.
54. Hard Rule
Offline device respects known disable state.
55. Stale Device
May require rebootstrap before re-enabling extension.
56. Hard Rule
No stale device silently reinstates disabled package.
57. Detection Pipeline
signal
→ validate
→ deduplicate
→ correlate technically
→ classify
→ triage
→ act
58. Hard Rule
Correlation is extension/package technical correlation, not user behavioral correlation.
59. Alert Deduplication
Multiple equivalent alerts collapse.
60. Hard Rule
No alert storm.
61. Detection Rule
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionDetectionRule { pub rule_id: ExtensionDetectionRuleId, pub trigger: ExtensionIncidentTrigger, pub threshold: DetectionThreshold, } }
62. Hard Rule
Rules versioned and reviewed.
63. Detection Threshold
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum DetectionThreshold { CountWithinWindow { count: u32, window: Duration }, Immediate, Composite(Vec<DetectionPredicate>), } }
64. Hard Rule
Rules cannot inspect forbidden private data classes.
65. Sandbox Violation
Immediate high-confidence signal.
66. Capability Violation
Examples:
unauthorized file access
unauthorized network origin
stale capability token
cross-tenant request
67. Hard Rule
Repeated violations can escalate quarantine.
68. Privacy Violation
Examples:
unexpected external sink
lock-screen secret leak
retention failure
forbidden telemetry field
69. Hard Rule
Privacy incidents receive explicit class, not hidden under generic security.
70. Supply-Chain Incident
Examples:
dependency revocation
publisher key compromise
tampered package
registry compromise
71. Hard Rule
Identify affected package graph via Part 142 lineage.
72. Blast Radius Analysis
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionBlastRadius { pub affected_packages: BTreeSet<ExtensionPackageId>, pub affected_versions: BTreeSet<ExtensionVersion>, pub affected_platforms: BTreeSet<PlatformClass>, pub affected_dependencies: BTreeSet<DependencyPackageId>, } }
73. Hard Rule
Blast radius uses technical deployment/install metadata minimized for privacy.
74. No Individual User List Unless Operationally Necessary
Hard rule.
75. Affected Installed Extension Discovery
Can be device-local.
76. Hard Rule
Central incident response need not enumerate all users to enforce revocation.
77. Containment Plan
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionContainmentPlan { pub incident: ExtensionIncidentId, pub actions: Vec<ExtensionContainmentAction>, } }
78. Containment Action
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionContainmentAction { Throttle, RevokeCapability(ExtensionPermissionClass), DisableNetwork, DisableBackground, QuarantineRuntime, BlockNewInstall, BlockUpdate, EmergencyDisable, } }
79. Hard Rule
Actions compose restrictively.
80. No Containment That Weakens Security Elsewhere
Hard rule.
81. User/Admin Notification
Required when impact is meaningful.
82. Hard Rule
Notification content truthful and privacy-minimized.
83. Example
"Extension disabled due to a security issue."
instead of exposing sensitive forensic details.
84. Publisher Notification
Publisher may receive incident notice.
85. Hard Rule
Publisher does not receive user identity or private content unless explicitly authorized/required.
86. Publisher Response
Can provide:
fix
explanation
new package
evidence
87. Hard Rule
Publisher cannot self-clear quarantine.
88. Incident Authority
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionIncidentRole { IncidentCommander, SecurityLead, PrivacyLead, ReleaseLead, MarketplaceLead, ForensicsLead, Scribe, } }
89. Hard Rule
Roles are scoped and temporary.
90. Incident Commander
Coordinates response.
91. Hard Rule
Incident commander is not automatic root/admin of extension data.
92. Separation of Duties
High-risk actions may require second approval.
93. Hard Rule
Forensics access and disable authority can be separated.
94. Forensic Evidence
Evidence must be minimized.
95. Evidence Class
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionForensicEvidenceClass { PackageArtifact, SignatureMetadata, DependencyGraph, RuntimeViolation, CrashSummary, RedactedLog, PolicyDecision, NetworkPolicyEvent, DataFlowViolation, } }
96. Hard Rule
Private message content is not default forensic evidence.
97. Forensic Evidence Record
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionForensicEvidence { pub evidence_id: EvidenceRef, pub incident: ExtensionIncidentId, pub class: ExtensionForensicEvidenceClass, pub digest: Digest, pub collected_at: Timestamp, } }
98. Hard Rule
Evidence provenance explicit.
99. Chain of Custody
For high-assurance incidents.
100. Chain Record
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionForensicCustodyRecord { pub evidence: EvidenceRef, pub actor_role: ExtensionIncidentRole, pub action: CustodyAction, pub timestamp: Timestamp, } }
101. Hard Rule
Custody records do not expose private user details.
102. Evidence Immutability
Content-addressed.
103. Hard Rule
Corrections via supersession, not mutation.
104. Forensic Snapshot
Can include extension package/runtime metadata.
105. Hard Rule
No whole-device memory dump by default.
106. Native Extension Memory Forensics
Only in exceptional high-assurance environment.
107. Hard Rule
Requires explicit policy/authorization and redaction.
108. WASM Forensics
Prefer:
module digest
trap stack
host-call history class
policy violation class
109. Hard Rule
No full linear-memory capture by default.
110. Network Forensics
Allowed:
approved origin class
connection attempt result
policy denial
111. Hard Rule
No raw anonymous route/peer IP tracing.
112. Data-Flow Forensics
Can identify:
source class
sink class
policy decision
without content.
113. Hard Rule
Use metadata classification, not payload inspection.
114. User Reports
Structured.
115. Report Class
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionUserReportClass { Spam, MisleadingUi, UnexpectedPermissionPrompt, PrivacyConcern, SecurityConcern, StabilityIssue, } }
116. Hard Rule
User report content is not automatically shared with publisher.
117. Abuse Report Evidence
Optional attachments require explicit user consent.
118. Hard Rule
No automatic upload of conversation context.
119. Incident Timeline
Record only meaningful events.
120. Hard Rule
Do not record every low-level runtime action.
121. Incident Timeline Event
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionIncidentTimelineEvent { pub incident: ExtensionIncidentId, pub at: Timestamp, pub class: IncidentTimelineEventClass, pub evidence: Option<EvidenceRef>, } }
122. Timeline Event Class
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum IncidentTimelineEventClass { Detection, Escalation, Containment, Quarantine, EvidenceCollected, FixAvailable, RecoveryStarted, Reinstated, Closed, } }
123. Hard Rule
Timeline is operational record, not surveillance log.
124. Situation Snapshot
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionIncidentSituation { pub known: Vec<String>, pub suspected: Vec<String>, pub unknown: Vec<String>, } }
125. Hard Rule
Known/suspected/unknown remain distinct.
126. No Motive Speculation
Hard rule.
127. Root Cause Analysis
Part 120 model applies.
128. Hard Rule
Root cause distinct from trigger.
129. Corrective Actions
Examples:
patch extension
tighten sandbox rule
add capability check
change update policy
revoke dependency
improve test coverage
130. Hard Rule
Implemented != verified.
131. Recovery Eligibility
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionRecoveryEligibility { NotReady, ReadyForLimitedRecovery, ReadyForFullRecovery, } }
132. Recovery Preconditions
Possible:
fixed package verified
new package certified
affected key rotated
dependency issue resolved
migration/recovery tested
revocation state updated
133. Hard Rule
Recovery is evidence-based.
134. Recovery Plan
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionRecoveryPlan { pub incident: ExtensionIncidentId, pub target_package: ExtensionPackageId, pub scope: ExtensionRecoveryScope, pub verification: Vec<RecoveryVerificationStep>, } }
135. Recovery Scope
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionRecoveryScope { ThisDevice, LimitedCohort, TenantScoped, GlobalEligible, } }
136. Hard Rule
Recovery scope can be narrower than original deployment.
137. Reinstatement
Separate from recovery execution.
138. Hard Rule
Successful fixed package install does not automatically clear incident.
139. Reinstatement Decision
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub enum ExtensionReinstatementDecision { Denied, Limited, Full, } }
140. Hard Rule
Reinstatement can require multi-authority approval for high-risk incident.
141. Reinstatement Criteria
root cause addressed
fix verified
certification valid
no active revocation
privacy/security evidence fresh
recovery test passed
142. Hard Rule
No reinstatement solely on publisher assurance.
143. Capability Restoration
Restored gradually.
144. Hard Rule
Do not automatically restore every historical high-risk permission.
145. Background Restoration
Re-enable jobs only after runtime/capability health verified.
146. Hard Rule
No automatic daemon/background restoration before health gate.
147. Network Restoration
Can be staged.
148. Hard Rule
External sink/network capability restored only after data-flow verification.
149. User Consent After Incident
May require renewed consent for sensitive capability.
150. Hard Rule
Incident recovery cannot silently re-consent on behalf of user.
151. Data Recovery
Quarantined extension data may need migration.
152. Hard Rule
Recovery preserves deletion tombstones/retention policy.
153. No Resurrection During Recovery
Hard rule.
154. Secret Rotation
If incident exposed credential risk:
revoke secret
rotate key
rebind fresh SecretRef
155. Hard Rule
Old secret reference invalid after rotation.
156. Publisher Key Compromise
Actions:
suspend publisher key
freeze new package publication
identify affected packages
require key rotation/reverification
157. Hard Rule
Publisher identity history preserved.
158. Package Signature Reissue
Does not automatically restore certification.
159. Hard Rule
Re-signed artifact still requires evidence reconciliation.
160. Dependency Compromise
Part 142 graph traversal identifies roots.
161. Hard Rule
Only affected dependency/package graph scoped.
162. Registry Compromise
May freeze resolution/install while keeping known-good offline packages subject to policy.
163. Hard Rule
No automatic trust in newly served metadata.
164. Marketplace Response
Possible:
hide listing
block new installs
show security notice
require update
delist
165. Hard Rule
Marketplace action separate from package runtime revocation.
166. Certification Response
Part 144:
suspend
revoke
supersede
167. Hard Rule
Certification state propagates to install/update gates.
168. Update Response
Part 143 may deliver emergency fixed package.
169. Hard Rule
Emergency update still exact-artifact verified.
170. State Sync Response
Part 141 propagates restrictive disable/revocation state.
171. Hard Rule
Remote state cannot clear local incident quarantine automatically.
172. Observability Response
Part 145 may increase local diagnostic retention temporarily within policy.
173. Hard Rule
Incident mode does not unlock forbidden telemetry classes.
174. Incident-Specific Telemetry Expansion
If allowed:
must be explicitly pre-authorized
time-bounded
scope-bounded
privacy-reviewed
175. Hard Rule
No emergency “log everything”.
176. Forensic Collection Capability
Separate capability.
177. Hard Rule
Only platform-controlled security component may collect forensic metadata.
178. Extension Cannot Self-Collect Incident Evidence From Other Extensions
Hard rule.
179. Cross-Extension Incident
If one shared dependency affects several extensions, each remains separately scoped.
180. Hard Rule
No merged cross-extension user activity graph.
181. Incident Command
Part 119 applies.
182. Hard Rule
Extension incident command cannot override hard privacy/security floor.
183. Breakglass
If supported:
scope
purpose
expiry
dual approval
audit
184. Hard Rule
Breakglass cannot decrypt user content without separate lawful/product architecture.
185. No Universal Decryption Key
Hard rule.
186. No Emergency Backdoor
Hard rule.
187. Incident Communications
Separate:
internal technical status
publisher notice
user/admin notice
public advisory
188. Hard Rule
Each audience sees minimum necessary information.
189. Public Advisory
Can state:
affected extension/version
impact class
required action
fixed version
190. Hard Rule
No exposure of individual users/tenants.
191. Tenant Incident Notice
Tenant-specific only when tenant scope relevant.
192. Hard Rule
Personal context remains separate.
193. SLA/SLO During Incident
Incident can suspend ordinary extension availability SLO.
194. Hard Rule
Security/privacy invariants remain non-negotiable.
195. Recovery Monitoring
After reinstatement, temporary enhanced aggregate monitoring.
196. Hard Rule
Still no private-content/user behavior capture.
197. Monitoring Window
Finite.
198. Hard Rule
Automatically returns to normal telemetry policy.
199. Residual Risk
Explicit.
200. Residual Risk Record
#![allow(unused)] fn main() { pub struct ExtensionResidualRisk { pub incident: ExtensionIncidentId, pub statement: String, pub compensating_controls: Vec<ControlRef>, pub expires_at: Option<Timestamp>, } }
201. Hard Rule
Hard invariant violations cannot be accepted as residual risk.
202. Incident Closure
Requires:
containment verified
recovery state known
corrective actions tracked
residual risk documented
evidence archived
203. Hard Rule
Closed does not erase incident.
204. Evidence Archive
Part 126.
205. Hard Rule
Incident evidence content-addressed and retention-governed.
206. Forensic Retention
Long enough for investigation, not indefinite by default.
207. Hard Rule
Sensitive evidence retention minimized.
208. Cryptographic Erasure
Where evidence policy permits after retention period.
209. Hard Rule
Audit digest/history may remain after raw evidence deletion.
210. Incident Metrics
Safe aggregate:
incident count by class
containment latency
quarantine count
recovery duration class
211. Forbidden:
user identity
developer blame score
publisher employee performance
private incident payload
212. Hard Rule
Security operations metrics are process/system metrics.
213. No Publisher Ranking From Incident Count
Hard rule.
214. Abuse Detection Metrics
Aggregate only.
215. Hard Rule
No user-report-based global publisher score.
216. Incident SLOs
Examples:
confirmed critical disable propagation within target
quarantine activation within target
revocation cache update within target
recovery verification within target
217. Security SLO
0 quarantined runtime retains broker authority
0 emergency-disabled package executes after policy convergence
0 revoked key signs newly accepted package
218. Privacy SLO
0 incident mode enables forbidden telemetry
0 forensic evidence contains private payload by default
0 support/incident system builds user behavior timelines
219. Failure Modes
false positive
overbroad quarantine
stale disable state
incomplete evidence
unsafe reinstatement
220. False Positive
Contain narrowly, review, reverse safely if cleared.
221. Overbroad Quarantine
Scope reconciliation can reduce containment.
222. Stale Disable State
Anti-rollback epoch + rebootstrap.
223. Incomplete Evidence
Known/suspected/unknown maintained.
224. Unsafe Reinstatement
Blocked by explicit recovery criteria.
225. User Appeal / Publisher Appeal
Marketplace/governance appeal path.
226. Hard Rule
Appeal does not auto-lift containment.
227. Appeal Evidence
Structured and scoped.
228. Hard Rule
Historical incident record preserved even if decision changes.
229. Testing
Need extension-incident-response testkit.
Required scenarios:
sandbox violation
publisher key compromise
network exfiltration attempt
false positive
emergency disable propagation
recovery/reinstatement
230. Quarantine Test
Runtime loses all broker authority immediately.
231. Capability Restriction Test
Selected capability removed without affecting unrelated allowed scope.
232. Background Test
Queued jobs cancelled on quarantine.
233. Network Test
Network-disable containment blocks external sink.
234. Revocation Test
Offline device with known revocation cannot run package.
235. Anti-Rollback Test
Older permissive policy rejected.
236. Publisher Key Test
Compromised key cannot authorize new package.
237. Evidence Test
Forensic bundle contains no private payload.
238. User Report Test
No conversation context uploaded by default.
239. False Positive Test
Containment can be safely narrowed/reversed with audit.
240. Recovery Test
Fixed package must pass certification/recovery gates before reinstatement.
241. Permission Restoration Test
Historical sensitive grants are not automatically restored.
242. Telemetry Test
Incident mode does not enable forbidden telemetry classes.
243. Multi-Device Test
Restrictive incident state propagates; local quarantine cannot be remotely cleared by normal sync.
244. Fuzzing
Fuzz:
incident records
emergency actions
quarantine policies
forensic manifests
recovery plans
245. Property Tests
Properties:
quarantined runtime can never invoke privileged broker call
emergency-disable epoch can never be downgraded by older state
publisher self-action can never clear platform quarantine
recovery can never restore revoked capability without current policy approval
246. Formal Verification Targets
Strong candidates:
incident lifecycle
quarantine/revocation precedence
emergency disable propagation
reinstatement gates
247. Kani Candidate
containment/authority/restoration invariants.
248. TLA+ Candidate
detect → triage → contain → investigate → recover → reinstate/close
249. Loom Candidate
Concurrent:
runtime host call
quarantine activation
grant epoch change
emergency policy refresh
250. Performance
Incident controls must be fast but not on normal hot path unless enforcement requires.
251. Enforcement Cache
Signed local incident/revocation state.
252. Hard Rule
Cache invalidated promptly on security epoch change.
253. Local Enforcement
Prefer local deny/quarantine once signed policy known.
254. Hard Rule
Do not require online round-trip for every broker call.
255. Incident Store
Separate:
incident metadata
containment decisions
forensic evidence refs
recovery plans
reinstatement decisions
audit timeline
256. Hard Rule
No private user-content warehouse.
257. Evidence Blob Store
Content-addressed, encrypted where required.
258. Hard Rule
Access purpose-scoped.
259. Partitioning
By:
extension
package
incident
publisher
dependency
260. Hard Rule
No user/person analytics partition.
261. Crate Layout
Recommended:
crates/
├── siar-extension-incident-core/
├── siar-extension-detection/
├── siar-extension-abuse/
├── siar-extension-quarantine/
├── siar-extension-emergency-disable/
├── siar-extension-forensics/
├── siar-extension-recovery/
├── siar-extension-reinstatement/
├── siar-extension-incident-observability/
└── siar-extension-incident-testkit/
262. siar-extension-incident-core
Owns:
ExtensionIncidentId
ExtensionIncidentClass
ExtensionIncidentState
ExtensionIncidentSeverity
263. siar-extension-detection
Technical detection rules/thresholds/dedup.
264. siar-extension-abuse
Notification/prompt/resource/policy abuse classification.
265. siar-extension-quarantine
Capability/runtime/network/background restriction state.
266. siar-extension-emergency-disable
Signed anti-rollback emergency policy and authority.
267. siar-extension-forensics
Evidence collection, custody, redaction, lineage.
268. siar-extension-recovery
Fixed package validation/data/secret recovery.
269. siar-extension-reinstatement
Evidence-backed restoration of capabilities/runtime.
270. siar-extension-incident-observability
Aggregate incident process health only.
271. siar-extension-incident-testkit
quarantine/revocation/forensics/recovery/privacy/formal tests.
272. Security, Privacy & Correctness Invariants
Mandatory:
1. Extension alerts, incidents, abuse signals, containment, quarantine, emergency disable, package revocation, forensic evidence, recovery, and reinstatement are distinct typed states and no single alert automatically implies maximum containment or permanent revocation.
2. Incident response applies the narrowest reliable containment that stops the observed risk while preserving user data, unrelated extension capabilities, and unaffected tenants/devices whenever evidence permits.
3. Quarantine, capability restriction, network disable, background disable, and emergency-disable state are enforced locally through signed anti-rollback policy/grant epochs so stale runtimes or offline devices cannot continue privileged execution.
4. No incident role—including incident commander, security lead, marketplace operator, or publisher—receives universal root access, plaintext secrets, user message content, or global decryption capability merely because an incident exists.
5. Forensic evidence defaults to package/runtime/policy/crash/dependency/data-flow metadata; private payloads, whole-device memory dumps, raw anonymous route data, social graphs, and conversation history are excluded unless a separately governed exceptional process explicitly requires them.
6. Publisher reports, user reports, abuse signals, and weak-confidence alerts cannot silently become user surveillance, publisher scoring, or motive judgments; known/suspected/unknown and evidence confidence remain explicit throughout the incident.
7. Emergency actions are signed, scoped, time/epoch governed, auditable, and subject to separation of duties for broad impact; no single online operator can silently disable arbitrary unrelated extensions globally.
8. Recovery and reinstatement require a fixed/verified package, fresh certification/security/privacy evidence, resolved revocation state, validated migration/recovery behavior, and current policy approval; publisher assurance alone cannot clear quarantine.
9. Capability/background/network restoration after an incident is deliberate and may require renewed consent; stale runtime tokens, compromised secrets, revoked publisher keys, or historical high-risk grants can never be resurrected automatically.
10. Incident mode cannot enable forbidden telemetry, unrestricted logging, hidden remote debugging, or full payload capture; temporary diagnostic expansion, if allowed, remains pre-authorized, scoped, time-bounded, redacted, and privacy-reviewed.
11. Incident metrics, timelines, evidence stores, and post-incident records are technical/process artifacts and cannot become per-user behavior histories, employee/developer blame systems, tenant surveillance, or publisher popularity/risk rankings.
12. Extension incident response integrates with runtime sandboxing, permissions, data governance, IPC, background jobs, notifications, UI, state sync, dependency/revocation graphs, update orchestration, certification, observability, marketplace governance, supply-chain security, PIR, and release evidence without creating a side channel around SIAR's security, privacy, anonymity, local-first, or tenant-isolation guarantees.
273. Initial Production Scope
Implement first:
typed incident lifecycle
technical incident triggers
abuse signal classes
evidence confidence
scoped quarantine states
capability/network/background restriction
full runtime quarantine
signed emergency-disable policy
anti-rollback emergency epoch
publisher key/package revocation integration
technical blast-radius analysis
forensic evidence registry
redacted incident bundles
chain-of-custody metadata
user/publisher notification paths
recovery plan
reinstatement criteria
secret/key rotation hooks
multi-device restrictive-state propagation
incident-to-update/certification hooks
privacy-safe incident metrics
extension-incident testkit
Then add:
advanced multi-authority emergency workflows
privacy-preserving compromise correlation
formal containment/reinstatement proofs
automated dependency-graph incident fanout
incident simulation exercises
publisher transparency reports
274. Definition of Done
Part 146 is complete when:
- extension incidents have typed state/severity/scope;
- abuse/security/privacy triggers are separate;
- quarantine is scoped and reversible;
- emergency disable is signed and anti-rollback;
- no incident role becomes universal admin;
- forensic evidence defaults to technical metadata;
- blast radius is technical, not user behavioral;
- recovery/reinstatement require fresh evidence;
- sensitive grants/secrets are not auto-restored;
- incident mode cannot unlock forbidden telemetry;
- restrictive state propagates across devices;
- evidence, metrics, and timelines do not become surveillance;
- quarantine/revocation/recovery/privacy/fuzz/formal tests are specified.
275. Final Architecture
EXTENSION SIGNALS
│
▼
DETECTION
│
┌──────────┼──────────┐
│ │ │
SECURITY PRIVACY ABUSE
│ │ │
└──────────┼──────────┘
▼
TRIAGE
│
▼
CONTAINMENT
┌──────────┼──────────┐
│ │ │
RESTRICT QUARANTINE DISABLE
│ │ │
└──────────┼──────────┘
▼
FORENSICS
│
▼
RECOVERY / REINSTATE
Extension-incident safety model:
technical detection
+
scoped containment
+
signed quarantine
+
anti-rollback disable
+
privacy-minimized forensics
+
evidence-backed recovery
+
deliberate reinstatement
+
post-incident improvement
not:
give responders unlimited access, collect everything, delete extension data immediately, and trust the publisher to declare the incident fixed
276. Final Principle
Extension security operations are trustworthy when SIAR can answer what happened, what evidence supports that conclusion, what authority was removed, what data was preserved, what must be fixed, and what evidence is required before authority returns.
The correct model is:
detect technical violations
+
triage with confidence
+
contain narrowly
+
quarantine decisively when needed
+
preserve evidence without collecting private content
+
rotate compromised trust
+
verify the fix
+
restore authority gradually
+
never turn incident response into universal surveillance or emergency backdoor
This architecture gives SIAR a privacy-preserving extension security-operations foundation for incident detection, abuse response, quarantine, emergency disable, forensics, recovery, reinstatement, publisher/dependency compromise handling, and post-incident improvement while preserving the anonymity, local-first, least-authority, runtime, permission, data-governance, update, certification, observability, and anti-surveillance guarantees established across Parts 34–145.